1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
An MOD
press statement on the same day stated that the attacks were
conducted in
self‑defence
in response to repeated Iraqi threats to coalition
aircraft.107
Iraqi air
defences
had been
increasing the frequency of their attacks using sophisticated
command and
control
arrangements, posing an increasing threat to coalition
aircraft.
Mr Hoon
told the House of Commons on 26 February:
“Since
January 1999, Saddam’s air defence units have made sustained
and
concerted
efforts to shoot down United Kingdom and United States aircraft.
During
that period
there have been more than 1,200 attempts to target them, using
surface-
to-air
missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. Coalition aircraft are
legally authorised to
respond to
those attacks in self-defence. They do so entirely in accordance
with
international
law, attacking only those military facilities that contribute, as
part of the
Iraqi
integrated air defence system, to the threat to coalition aircraft
… Over recent
weeks, the
Iraqis have significantly increased their efforts, amounting to a
qualitative
and
quantitative increase in the threat. In January, there were more
surface-to-air
missile
attacks than in the whole of 2000. The Iraqis have used new
tactics, including
the use of
radars and command centres located outside the southern zone to
cue
offensive
systems within it. That threat to our Service Personnel is real and
present.
The
operation on the evening of 16 February was therefore planned and
carried
out against
that background. It was a proportionate response in self-defence,
taken
solely to
reduce the risk to our aircrew carrying out routine humanitarian
patrols of the
southern
No-Fly Zone.”108
197.
Mr Sawers
advised Mr Blair that as a result of the attacks there was now
more
attention
on Iraq, and that having to defend the NFZs so publicly made it
more difficult
to move
back from them.109
198.
Mr Sawers
proposed developing benchmarks against which to gauge the
present
policy.
Those were:
“•
Effectiveness,
in containing the threat from Iraq against its
neighbours;
in
preventing Saddam building up his WMD; and in preventing a
new
humanitarian
crisis;
•
Sustainability,
so that we have a policy which we can keep going for as long
as
Saddam
remains in power, if necessary the next six to eight years. That
entails
having and
retaining the support of both the countries of the region and our
own
public. A
new P5 consensus would also help; and
•
Control, so
that Saddam cannot dictate each step. We have had better
control
in the last
two years than we had before, and we should be careful not to
give
it
up.”
199.
An internal
FCO minute on the 16 February attack, which was produced
later
that month,
stated that the Pentagon’s decision to play up the operation was a
serious
107
Gov.uk, 17
February 2001, Air attacks
on Iraq: Statement by the Ministry of Defence.
108
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26
February 2001, column 620.
109
Minute
Sawers to Prime Minister, 20 February 2001, ‘Iraq: After the
Bombing’.
229