6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
The longer
dislocation lasts, particularly if there are major terrorist
incidents, the
greater the
likelihood of real disruptive challenges emerging. The extent to
which
military
operations have public support is also important. A strong
patriotic factor will
restrain
disruption and increase tolerance of minor
inconveniences.”
893.
The CCS formed
a number of other “key judgements”:
•
Oil price
rises would be the main economic factor. “General uncertainty”
would
affect the
stock market and, possibly, domestic consumer spending. Tourism
and
air travel
would be affected by dislocation of routes.
•
The
potential for further protests by anti-war groups and ethnic groups
and
counter-demonstrations
would increase. There was “opportunity for violent
confrontations
between protest groups, ethnic groups, or targeted against
ethnic
groups,
particularly in the aftermath of a major terrorist
incident”.
•
The
firefighters’ dispute would probably go ahead.
•
Heightened
anxiety about terrorist attacks was likely to cause
increased
disruption
from hoaxes and false alarms. The JIC assessed that the threat
from
Al Qaida
and Islamic extremist groups remained “high”. “Al Qaida and
other
Islamic
extremists will seek to exploit the circumstances of a war
situation”.
•
Military
resources would be unavailable to cover industrial action
contingencies
other than
the firefighters’ dispute. A call up of medical Reservists
would
probably
affect NHS provision.
894.
The CCS stated
that contingency planning by departments was in hand. In
many
cases,
existing contingency plans were “adaptable to the circumstances
arising from
operations
against Iraq”.
895.
The CCS paper
continued to be updated until January 2003, when the
AHGI
established
a Domestic Impact Sub-Group overseen by Mr Jonathan
Stephens,
Treasury
Director Public Services, supported by the CCS (see Section
6.5).432
896.
In late
November and early December 2002, DFID officials lobbied for
a
cross-government
exercise to cost each of the military options being
considered
by the UK,
and to include humanitarian costs.
897.
During
December, DFID officials also sought, with some success, to
improve
official-level
co-ordination with the MOD and the rest of Whitehall on
humanitarian
issues.
898.
In a meeting
with DFID officials on 18 November, Ms Short expressed concern
that
not only
was no money set aside for humanitarian actions, but that the issue
was not
432
Letter
Stephens to Phillips, 20 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Domestic Implications
of Military Action’ attaching
Paper
[draft] Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 17 January 2003,
‘Potential Impact on UK of Operations
Against
Iraq’.
263