6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
front line
– either in part or in total; and (iii) how the flow of information
can
be improved
so that in future Ministers receive timely and accurate advice
on
these
issues.”
448.
On
17 April, Maj Gen Fry replied to Lord Bach’s request, on
behalf of Lt Gen Reith,
reporting
that “other than the continuing saga of desert combat clothing,
there [we]re no
other key
equipment shortfalls” in theatre.220
As of
13 April, the “shortfall amounted to
18,300
suits and 12,500 boots”. Additional clothing would arrive in
theatre by 18 April,
meeting the
requirement for boots, and reducing the shortfall of suits to
3,275.
449.
Maj Gen Fry
confirmed that all UORs delivered to theatre were “forwarded to
the
front
line”. On Combat ID, he wrote that whilst its delivery into theatre
was aligned with
Challenger
2, “not all of it could be fitted within the compressed timeline
before D-Day”
because
eight Challenger sets in a container “were temporarily misplaced
within Kuwait”.
Maj Gen Fry
stated that the decision to proceed without the full range of
Combat ID
fitted in
some Challengers was the GOC’s and implied that was necessary
because of
US
timings.
450.
Addressing the
issues raised about the flow of information, Maj Gen Fry wrote
that
the weekly
updates on UORs were “a significant staff burden” and that
producing them
“at any
greater frequency would prove counter productive”.
451.
Commenting on
the note to Lord Bach, his Private Office wrote:
“This is,
frankly, pretty dismissive of your concerns … [It] offers no
explanation
of why the
‘desert clothing saga’ arose and no guidance on how and when
the
shortfalls
will be addressed … [It] contradicts the earlier advice from the
DLO that
some UORs
had been delivered to theatre but not on to the front
line.”221
452.
At his meeting
on 28 April, Lord Bach noted that no more UORs for the
invasion
phase had
been raised in the last fortnight, no more were expected, and all
were
expected to
be delivered by 1 May.222
He
therefore agreed that the monitoring of Phase
III UOR
implementation should cease but perceived a continuing requirement,
“for the
time being
at least”, to keep track of the Phase IV UORs.
453.
The “bulk of
the discussion” focused on “the continuing difficulty experienced
by
the DLO,
DPA and ECC in securing reliable information from theatre about
equipment
matters”
and how best to present publicly what was understood to be “the
generally
positive
news on this front”. Lord Bach remained concerned about the flow of
information
on
equipment matters.
220
Minute Fry
to PS/Min(DP), 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC:
UORs’.
221
Manuscript
comment MOD [junior official] on Minute Fry to PS/Min(DP),
17 April 2003,
‘Iraq: Op
TELIC: UORs’.
222
Minute
PS/Minister(DP) to MA/DVCDS(EC), 28 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Op
TELIC UORs’.
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