The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“in a worst
case scenario” reduce the warning of an approaching Iraqi missile
to “as little
as five or
six seconds”.
137.
Mr Webb told
the Inquiry why the proposed attack was necessary.78
Iraqi
surface‑to-air
missiles and anti-aircraft artillery contesting the NFZs had
previously been
controlled
by radars close to those weapon systems:
“What they
[the Iraqi military] perfected was to move the radars back north
of
33 degrees
north … up around Baghdad, and then to provide information to
the
surface-to-air
missiles and the anti-aircraft artillery by fibre-optic links
…
…
“What that
meant was that there was a risk that the aircraft would find
themselves
patrolling,
and suddenly, instead of being illuminated by a radar close to them
that
they could
identify, something much further back would be controlling a
missile
which would
suddenly come their way.
“This made
the operation of considerably more risk …
“That
target set was very, very carefully considered for, not only the
basic legality,
but there
were also questions about proportionality and risk to civilian
casualties …”
138.
Lord Williams
was briefed on the proposed attack by MOD and FCO officials
on
139.
Later that
day, Mr David Brummell, the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers,
wrote
to Mr
Martin Hemmings, the MOD Legal Adviser, recording that Lord
Williams was
“satisfied
that a proportionate attack on the target could … be justified in
the context of
allied
operations in the southern No-Fly Zone”.80
Mr Brummell
wrote that Lord Williams
noted
the:
“…
assurance provided by FCO officials at today’s briefing meeting
that without
the No-Fly
Zones, they would be confident that further oppression would
result
on a scale
comparable to that which led to the grave humanitarian crisis and
the
establishment
of the Zones in 1991 and 1992. In the
absence of that categorical
assurance,
the Attorney General would not have felt able to advise as
…
above. If
that assurance no longer holds firm, he declines to
approve
the
target.”
78
Public
hearing, 24 November 2009, page 141.
79
Letter
Brummell to Hemming, 30 January 2001, ‘Iraq: Target’.
80
Letter
Brummell to Hemming, 30 January 2001, ‘Iraq: Target’.
216