9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
304.
The Game-Plan
proposed that draft text would be circulated on 9 May,
enabling
informal
discussion at a “Security Council retreat” in the following days.
A series
of calls and
visits by Mr Straw, Secretary Powell and officials would start
the
negotiation process.
305.
Sir David
Manning spoke to Dr Rice on the same day, and reported that
she
“was
broadly happy with our strategy for deploying it [the draft
resolution] among the
P5”,
referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council:
the US, UK,
France,
Russia and China.187
306.
Following a
conversation between Mr Straw and Secretary Powell, a UK draft
of
text which
referred to “some form of international verification” was faxed to
the US.188
307.
Mr Straw told
Sir David Manning that the absence of any reference to the
United
Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
inspectors in
the text of
the omnibus resolution meant “we were very exposed on the question
of why
UNMOVIC was
not on the bus”.189
308.
Commenting on
his series of conversations with Secretary Powell on 7
May,
Mr Straw
observed: “We had all accepted that at a later date we might want
to cut the
resolution
into parts.”
309.
On 8 May, Mr
McDonald reported that Secretary Powell told Mr Straw
that
Mr Annan’s
first reaction to the draft had been “pretty good”, and that he had
raised the
absence of
UNMOVIC.190
Secretary
Powell also told Mr Straw that US officials were
considering
whether UNMOVIC should be the subject of a separate
resolution.
310.
Mr Straw told
Cabinet on 8 May that, within the next few weeks, a
national
conference
with a broad range of delegates should produce an Iraqi Interim
Authority.191
The UK was
working with the US on a draft UN resolution which would cover
the
appointment
of a Special Co-ordinator, the lifting of sanctions, oil revenues
and the trade
in stolen
Iraqi artefacts. He added that “No legitimisation of the Coalition
military action
was
required, although some countries feared that we sought such
cover.”
311.
Mr Blair said
that the draft text was “offered as a solution to the way forward
on
Iraq”. He
told Cabinet that once the Special Co-ordinator had been appointed
the UN
would
become engaged in the political process.
187
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
188
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversations with Colin Powell,
7
May’.
189
Letter
Straw to Manning, 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Colin
Powell, 7 May’.
190
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 8 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with Colin Powell,
8
May’.
191
Cabinet
Conclusions, 8 May 2003.
183