2 |
Decision-making within government
“Collective
responsibility requires that Ministers should be able to
express
their views
frankly in the expectation that they can argue freely in private
while
maintaining
a united front when decisions have been reached …
“If
permitted to demonstrate their degree of attachment to any given
policy,
Ministers
could absolve themselves from responsibility for decisions that
they
have
nevertheless agreed to stand by … Thus, every Minister in the 2003
Cabinet
could
legitimately be held to account for the decision to use armed force
in Iraq.
The
resignation of Ministers at the time of this particular decision
recognised and
reinforced
that principle.
“… The
Government is committed to ensuring public participation in its
decision
making: it
exposes its thinking to Parliament and public via parliamentary
debate,
public
consultation, and engagement with the media …”
13.
Mr Straw also
described a “decision to commit British Service Personnel to
an
armed
conflict” as being an “exceptionally serious” issue.
14.
Many of Mr
Straw’s points were reiterated by Mr Dominic Grieve, the
Attorney
General,
when maintaining the veto in 2012.
15.
Mr Geoff Hoon,
Defence Secretary from 1999 to 2005, told the Inquiry that he
had:
“… always
seen the position of any Secretary of State as being in a sense
the
department’s
voice in the Cabinet, but equally, the Cabinet’s voice in the
department.
So it is a
two-way process …”2
16.
The Cabinet
Secretary is the most senior civil servant providing policy advice
to the
Prime
Minister.
17.
There is no
fixed set of functions attached to the role. Priorities and
objectives for
each
appointee are set by the Prime Minister of the day.
18.
Certain
responsibilities sit by convention and long practice with the
Cabinet
Secretary:
•
overall
responsibility for security and intelligence systems and
structures
(in 2003,
day-to-day responsibility was delegated to Sir David Omand
by
Sir Andrew
Turnbull);
2
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 178.
269