3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
“Secondly
there is the difficulty of confronting the US Administration itself
about
the need to
produce a credible political plan … (and without which the
Prime
Minister’s
conditions for UK participation could not be met) … we need to
move
with
considerably more urgency to seek to move American planning into
acceptable
channels
and basically I would judge, to slow it down. This is particularly
the case
when a
major element in the strategic preparation we would want to see is
concerted
diplomatic
effort to secure agreement to resumed WMD inspections by the UN
both
for its own
sake and to ease the problems of public opinion and legal base.
This [is]
in addition
to the need for prior progress on Arab/Israel and, perhaps, getting
further
on the road
to success in Afghanistan …”
159.
Sir Kevin
concluded that the UK needed “some early careful engagement
with
the US
policy machine, rather than just with the Pentagon”. He would be
“visiting
Washington
on 17-19 July and could carry messages but that would, of course,
depend
on prior
Ministerial guidance”.
160.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit’s minute was sent after Mr Watkins’ letter to Sir David
Manning
of 2
July.
161.
Mr Watkins
marked the letter to Mr Hoon observing that the MOD did not know
the
views of
Secretary Powell or Dr Rice; and there was a risk “that the PM’s
conditions will
162.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that getting involved in US planning had
posed
a dilemma
because:
“… it was
clear … even at that stage, if one begins discussions with the
United
States on
the military track, albeit without commitment, it becomes
increasingly
difficult
to keep options open absolutely completely … [W]e made it clear to
them
that our
participation … was purely to inform British Government thinking
…
“On the one
hand, if one is drawn into discussion of timescales and details, we
might
give
misleading signals of support for military action that was not
present at that
stage.
“On the
other hand, if we continued to stand aside, it might be too late
for us to
influence
events or meet the political requirement which might be placed on
us.”73
163.
Although it
had only fragmentary intelligence about how the regime
would
deal with
an attack including ground forces, the JIC assessed on 4 July that
only
massive
military force would be guaranteed to topple Saddam
Hussein.
72
Manuscript
comment Watkins to Hoon, 3 July 2002, on Minute Tebbit to Secretary
of State [MOD],
3 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
73
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 20-21.
31