The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
for all
communities and denominations proportional to their numbers”. The
JIC assessed
that his
statement would be “very persuasive for the Shia and may even have
some
effect
among Sunnis”.
307.
The JIC judged
that Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani “would accept a limited delay of
no
more than
two months, if clearly required for security or technical
reasons”.
308.
In preparation
for a breakfast meeting with Prime Minister Allawi on 5
November,
Mr Blair
was briefed that there were “growing
doubts” over the commitment of the IIG
and Prime
Minister Allawi to January elections.161
309.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary also provided a list of “points that Allawi needs
to cover
before he
approves any military action”, which included:
•
demonstrating
publicly that there had been “every reasonable effort to
identify
and
negotiate with representatives from Fallujah”;
•
having a
political strategy to deal with the impact of military action on
party
registration
for the elections and on planned international
conferences;
•
ensuring he
was content with the military plans and the role of the ISF;
and
•
preparing
a “follow-up
package of political and economic measures”.
310.
Over
breakfast, Mr Blair advised that:
“… he knew
the military commanders were keen to move now. But it was vital
that
we balanced
the political and military priorities. Unless there was an argument
for an
immediate
move, then he believed we needed to take the necessary time to
exhaust
all avenues
of dialogue with the Sunnis. He also thought that we needed to
issue an
ultimatum
to Fallujah.”162
311.
Mr Blair also
set out the reasons why holding elections on time was
crucial.
He advised
“we needed to portray this to the outside world as the
justification for
everything
we had done to date and for any operation in
Fallujah”.
312.
On 5 November,
Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary sent an IPU paper
on
phased
drawdown in Iraq to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary.163
The paper
considered:
“… whether
we should make public our intention that the MNF presence in Iraq
will
alter
during 2005 and end soon after the December 2005 elections (with
any further
troop
presence in Iraq being purely to train and support the ISF, and
under a new
arrangement
with the Iraqi government).”
161
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 4 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Breakfast with
Allawi’.
162
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Discussion with Iyad Allawi,
5 November
2004’.
163
Letter
Adams to Quarrey, 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: MNF Presence in Iraq in
2005: Phased Draw-Down’
attaching
Paper ‘Iraq: MNF Presence in Iraq in 2005: Phased
Draw-Down’.
446