4.4  |  The search for WMD

338.  Sir Richard added that SIS had been “closely involved in the protracted saga of

the [BW] trailers”. The extended debate over the trailers’ function “served to underline

the importance of controlling publicity and of co-ordination both with the US and within

the US system”. He hoped that would become easier to manage once the ISG was up

and running.

339.  In conclusion, Sir Richard said that, over the next week, SIS would be refining

requirements for the “surge effort” described in his letter.

340.  During his conversation with President Bush on 6 June, Mr Blair stressed the

importance of offering inducements to Iraqis involved in WMD programmes.163 He said

that he was relaxed about the ISG and confident it would get results.

341.  At its meeting on 6 June, the Evidence and Elimination Task Force was informed

that, in relation to the recruitment of inspectors, Dr David Kelly, MOD Special Adviser

Counter-proliferation and Arms Control, was conducting “a recce to theatre”, which

would “inform a further briefing of prospective UK ISG inspectors on 13 June”.164

342.  The Task Force was also informed:

• “All BW samples” had, “so far, been negative or inconclusive”. The official report

on samples from the bio-trailer was “inconclusive”.

• The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff had “formed a ‘Tiger Team’ to look into WMD

lessons learned”.

343.  Reporting the main points to have emerged from the meeting, Mr Dowse wrote:

• “… [d]espite all previous assurances, the US have done no further investigation

of the first two bio-lab trailers and – incredibly – have lost the third … it was left

unguarded and disappeared”.

• The DoD was suggesting “adopting as ‘hypotheses’ that Iraq either destroyed

all its WMD before the war, or hid it in Syria (and Sudan) – and then focusing

intelligence collection efforts on finding evidence to prove this. This looked

dangerous …”

• The ISG had “no clear lines of command … or of reporting back to Washington”.

• There was “clear competition between US agencies”.165

344.  Mr Blair discussed the ISG with Mr Straw and Mr Hoon on 9 June.166 They agreed

that it needed to become operational as quickly as possible with clear command and

control arrangements.

163  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 6 June’.

164  Minutes, 6 June 2003, Iraq WMD Evidence and Elimination Task Force meeting.

165  Minute Dowse to Oakden, 6 June 2003, ‘DCDI Iraqi WMD Co-ordination Meeting, 6 June’.

166  Letter Manning to McDonald, 9 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

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