The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr David
Ochmanek, a senior analyst at RAND and a former member of the US
Air
Force and a
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy in the Pentagon
from
1993 to
1995, concluded that a robust invasion force would be needed
because Saddam
Hussein’s
troops were “unlikely to crack unless faced with an overwhelming
adversary”.157
Dr Toby
Dodge, a Research Fellow at the ESRC Centre for the Study of
Globalisation
and
Regionalisation, University of Warwick, wrote that the Iraqi regime
had sacrificed the
military
efficiency of the Iraqi armed forces to ensure they did not pose a
threat to Saddam
Hussein’s
continued rule. That meant that although conventional military
opposition to an
invasion
might be short lived, a coup launched against the regime from
within the security
services
would happen, if at all, in the final moments of any war. The
military campaign
would be
fought in the cities of Iraq, primarily Baghdad, against a
background of intense
media
coverage.
Dr Faleh A.
Jaber, an Iraqi sociologist based in London, argued that the Iraqi
Army might
react in
ways comparable to 1991 with sections opting for mutiny, some
surrendering and
others
fighting to defend the Government. A coup was unlikely unless the
US succeeded
in
attracting a considerable segment of the “ruling tribal alliance”
to its side.
In a
separate essay, Dr Jaber concluded that, in the light of the
inherent weakness of
organised
political parties in the South, the response to an invasion could
range from
sustained,
organised or disorganised rebellions to mob-like violence or
gangster-like
retribution.
That would help bring Ba’athist rule to an end, but could also
bring forward
unfettered
chaos.
Several
contributors to the Adelphi Paper warned of the potential for
violent disorder in
post-conflict
Iraq (see Section 6.5).
446.
Mr Blair read
the Adelphi Paper in mid-February and asked a number
of
questions, including:
“•
What is our
military’s assessment of the likely consequences of an
attack
on Iraq; ie
how many casualties; how quickly the collapse?
•
Why do we
not think the SRG [Special Republican Guard] will dig in,
inside
Baghdad and
fight a guerrilla campaign?
•
What is the
prospect of a pre-emptive BW or CW attack on our troops in
Kuwait,
and are we
certain we are adequately prepared and our troops
protected?
•
Why will
the 2,000 key individuals and the 26,000 SRG personnel … not
fight
to the
death, given the hatred of them by ordinary
Iraqis?”158
157
Dodge T
& Simon S (eds). Iraq at the
Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime
Change.
IISS
Adelphi Paper 354. Oxford University Press, January
2003.
158
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and
Military Questions’.
454