The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
346.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that on 12 February Mr Hoon
raised
the issue
of financing reconstruction from oil sales with Secretary Rumsfeld,
who
agreed that
oil proceeds were key and should not be misinterpreted as a reason
for
the conflict.164
DoD would
make it clear that oil proceeds should go to Iraq’s
people.
OFF was
a good basis on which to work.
347.
The Embassy
also reported agreement during Mr Hoon’s talks with
Secretary
Rumsfeld
and Dr Rice that “broad UN cover for day after management in Iraq
would
bring
political, financial and legal benefits. But this cover should not
come with inefficient
micro-management
by UN agencies.”165
The Embassy
commented that, although ORHA
remained
“disputed turf” and Mr Hoon had heard conflicting accounts of
its role while in
Washington,
it would be the “key body in ruling and reconstructing a defeated
Iraq”. The
UK was
“slightly ahead of the game” in already having Maj Gen Cross there,
but the US
would
welcome more UK secondees.
348.
Neither the
Embassy’s report of Mr Hoon’s meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld
nor
the record
written by Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private
Secretary, referred
to any
discussion of de-Ba’athification.166
349.
Mr Hoon
told the Inquiry that, at the meeting, he handed Secretary
Rumsfeld
a paper
which, while not using the word “de-Ba’athification”,
had:
“…
emphasised … that there would be people who had joined the Ba’ath
Party …
not because
they necessarily were enthusiastic supporters of Saddam
Hussein,
and we felt
that there ought to be a distinction between those who were
enthusiastic
supporters
and those who simply joined the party in order to gain position …
and
I think
a similar argument arises in relation to the army”.167
350.
The Inquiry
has been unable to identify the paper handed over by
Mr Hoon.
351.
During
Mr Hoon’s meeting with Dr Rice she expressed concern that the
existing
military
campaign plan for the South of Iraq assumed local administrators
would remain
in place.
Her assessment was that those individuals, who were mainly Sunni in
an
otherwise
Shia area, would flee after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s
regime.168
Mr Hoon’s
response was to point to the value of achieving UN cover for
Coalition
operations
in Iraq.
164
Telegram
203 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit to
Washington’.
165
Telegram
204 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit to
Washington:
Day After Management’.
166
Minute
Watkins to Policy Director, 13 February 2003, ‘Meeting with Donald
Rumsfeld:
12 February
2003’.
167
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 160.
168
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 13 February 2003, ‘Defence Secretary’s call on
Condi Rice:
12 February 2003’.
370