8 | The
invasion
prevent
Saddam Hussein from successfully sabotaging Iraq’s oil
infrastructure, “may
have been
the seminal decision of the campaign”.96
Environmental
damage had been
minimised,
and the revenue source that would be vital to Iraq’s future
prosperity had
been
largely protected.
149.
The “Shock and
Awe” strategic air campaign was launched, as planned,
on
21 March.97
It involved
heavy bombing of Baghdad. Targets in and around Mosul,
Tikrit
and Kirkuk
were also attacked.
150.
A letter from
the MOD to No.10 on 23 March reported that: “As of 1100Z
today
UK tactical
air and TLAM had attacked 115 strategic targets.” 98
151.
By 24 March,
the main focus of Coalition air activity had shifted from
strikes
against
fixed targets to support of land operations including Close Air
Support (CAS).99
That remained
the priority for the duration of combat operations.
152.
For the
duration of the campaign, the RAF was tasked as a Coalition
asset,
providing
support to all Coalition nations. By early April, the RAF was
flying about
10 percent
of the 1,200 sorties being flown per day by the
Coalition.100
153.
In July 2003,
the MOD assessed that the RAF had flown almost 2,500
sorties,
6 percent
of the Coalition total.101
154.
The guidance
provided on targeting is addressed in Section 6.2.
A Battle
Damage Assessment (BDA) is made after an attack to assess its
impact and
effectiveness,
including estimates of “collateral damage” – the damage to
facilities and the
death or
injury of people in the vicinity of the target.
As Section
6.2 shows, the risk of collateral damage was an important
consideration on
selecting
and approving targets for attack by the UK.
The Chiefs
of Staff were advised on 28 March that:
“The Battle
Damage Assessment (BDA) process was not providing
sufficient
verification
of the damage done to Iraqi military units; work was in hand to
improve
96
Report
Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown
Report’.
97
Briefing
MOD, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep, 0600Z
22 March 2003’.
98
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 23 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Progress of Military
Campaign’.
99
Briefing
[MOD], 24 March 2003, ‘Annex to evening sitrep, 24 March:
Military’.
100
GlobalSecurity.org,
4 April 2003, Minister of
State for the Armed Forces and the Chief of the Air
Staff:
Press
Conference at the Ministry of Defence, London – 4 April
2003.
101
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq – First Reflections, July
2003.
102
Minutes, 28
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
27