10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
265.
The
ORHA(South) team had, to date, proved largely ineffective. UK
forces had
now begun
to plan on the basis that they would get little practical support
from ORHA
in the
immediate recovery phase.
266.
The covering
letter from Ms Short’s Private Office stated:
“The visit
report … has clear implications for the planned Ministerial
discussion
[at the Ad
Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation on 25 April] regarding
UK
secondments
to ORHA. Given the competing claims on scarce resources to
support
Iraq,
Ministers will wish to prioritise any staff deployments carefully.
Ministers and
Accounting
Officers will also wish to satisfy themselves that any UK
secondments
to ORHA
meet the usual standards of effectiveness and cost
efficiency.”
267.
Sir David
Manning commented: “Very unhelpful. More than a whiff of ‘not
invented
here’ so
won’t support/try to improve.”153
268.
An annex to
Mr Malik’s report, marked “Not for circulation outside DFID”
and not
sent to
No.10 or other departments, added:
“Overall,
engagement with ORHA is very high risk. Across the board, staffing
is
thin,
management is weak, officials are frustrated, there is poor
strategy/planning,
weak
internal communications and decision making. Equally, it could be
argued that
engagement
would help address these weaknesses.
“Poorly
worked out plans could do damage on the ground. Equally, there are
areas
in which
good teams have been assembled and good planning is underway. In
these
areas, ORHA
will set the agenda or reform for some years to come.
“The key
judgement is whether UK policy makers can influence an ORHA that is
and
will remain
dominated by US DoD.”154
269.
The annex
identified three options for DFID:
•
No
engagement. This would marginalise DFID within the UK Government
and in
ORHA. It
would, however, “safeguard” DFID and leave it free to engage with
the
UN, IFIs
and NGOs and pursue a “more normal DFID country
operation”.
•
Full
engagement “as proposed by the Foreign Secretary and
General
Tim
Cross”.
•
Limited
engagement in carefully chosen areas, in an “eyes and ears” role
as
directed by
Ms Short. That would comprise three or four DFID
secondees.
153
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter DFID [junior official] to Rycroft, 22
April 2003,
‘Iraq: Engagement
with ORHA’.
154
Paper DFID,
[undated], ‘Iraq: ORHA Visit Report – Annex’.
51