The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

19. On 19 March, in response to a question from Mr Martin Caton in the House of

Commons, Mr Blair said:

“Of course, I understand that, if there is conflict, there will be civilian casualties …

However … civilian casualties in Iraq are occurring every day as a result of the rule

of Saddam Hussein. He will be responsible for many, many more deaths even in one

year than we will be in any conflict.”20

20. The Coalition began military action against Iraq later that day.

21. In the second half of 2002, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) produced four

Assessments which identified the possibility of significant civilian casualties in the event

of a Coalition attack on Iraq.

22. In August 2002, the JIC assessed Saddam Hussein’s diplomatic and military options

to deter, avert or limit the scope and effectiveness of a US attack.21 The JIC’s Key

Judgements included:

“Saddam would order the use of CBW [chemical and biological weapons] against

Coalition forces at some point, probably after a Coalition attack had begun. Once

Saddam was convinced that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained

use of CBW against Coalition forces, supporting regional states and Israel.”

23. The Assessment also identified a number of “unorthodox options” that Saddam

Hussein might pursue, including:

“… a ‘scorched earth’ policy … with the aim of creating a humanitarian or

environmental catastrophe …”

24. In September, the JIC assessed how Iraq might use chemical and biological

weapons.22 Its Key Judgements included:

“If not previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of whatever

CBW weapons remain available late in a ground campaign or as a final act of

vengeance.”

20 House of Commons, Official Report, 19 March 2003, column 934.

21 JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options’.

22 JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons –

Possible Scenarios’.

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