10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
301.
On the second
point, the Cabinet Office briefing advised that:
•
the pace of
reconstruction was still too slow and therefore the “political
dividend”
was
small;
•
power
supply was “parlous”; and
•
UK funding
for 2005/06 was almost all committed, requiring “tough
Ministerial
decisions”
after further work by officials.
302.
The Annotated
Agenda for the meeting invited Ministers to consider:
•
What impact
was US and international funding for reconstruction having on
the
ground?
Disbursement lagged behind stated international commitments.
The
US was
focusing on short-term impact. The UN was re-establishing a
presence
in Iraq and
was starting to “take on the role we would expect of them”.
Donor
efforts had
lacked focus; better donor co-ordination behind an Iraqi figure
was
one of the
planned outcomes of the Brussels International Conference in
June.
•
What more
the UK could do, to further improve UN, World Bank and
international
bilateral reconstruction efforts?
•
What
“concrete outputs” did the UK want from the Brussels
International
Conference
and the next donor meeting in Amman in July?
•
Was the
funding available for reconstruction across Government
adequate?
•
Was the UK
investing at a level that supported its objective of creating
stability
such that
there could be troop withdrawals?
•
Was the UK
delivering a short-term return which would boost the
political
process?
•
What more
the UK could do, to improve power supply over the summer
and
boost
investment in infrastructure?
•
Was the UK
offering the necessary support to the ITG’s media
effort?175
303.
On funding,
the Annotated Agenda stated that DFID’s allocation for Iraq
was
£65m for
2005/06, but that it had already “programmed” £84.3m (£63m of which
would
be spent in
southern Iraq). The tri-departmental Global Conflict Prevention
Pool (see
Section
12.1) was expected to allocate £25m for Iraq in 2005/06, of which
£22m had
already
been programmed. The MOD would be bidding to the Treasury for
additional
funding for
QIPs, having spent £27m on QIPs since 2003. The MOD’s budget for
military
activity in
Iraq in 2005/06 was £927m.
304.
In discussion,
Ministers commented that the power situation was serious
and
would get
worse over the summer, but the UK was “doing what it
could”.176
175
Annotated
Agenda, 26 May 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
176
Minutes, 26
May 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
245