The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
declaration provided “limited, but new information on two UAV
programmes”,
which Iraq
claimed had “started after 1998”, that had been included in
reports
recently
passed to UNMOVIC. They would be “used as target drones”.
The
JIC judged
that the UAVs “would have a significantly better performance”
than
claimed and
could be “adapted to chemical and biological agent
delivery”.
Conclusion
The JIC
concluded that the declaration so far analysed failed to address
the outstanding
issues from
UNSCOM’s report to the Security Council in 1999 and “made no
attempt to
answer any
of the points outlined in the UK dossier”. Iraq might:
“… feel
they dealt with these points in their previous rebuttal of the
dossier. Some of
the
deficiencies may be addressed in the parts yet to be translated,
but this does not
look
likely.”
152.
On 20
December, Mr Miller sent Sir David Manning a further DIS
overview of
153.
Mr Miller
re-stated the key findings outlined in the 18 December JIC
Assessment
and
identified the principal areas of apparent omission. The main new
points
identified were:
•
“an
admission by the Iraqis that they have delivered 50 Al Samoud
missiles to
their
military. The UK dossier stated that at least 50 of these missiles
had been
produced
and were being deployed to military units;
•
details of
missile related procurement activities post-1998, which Iraq
claims
were for
permitted programmes. There are no details concerning the origin
of
the
material and equipment procured, some of which we judge were
obtained
illicitly;
and
•
the
document fails to cover refurbishment at potential BW
sites.”
154.
Mr Miller
reported that the DIS would continue to analyse the declaration
when a
full
English text was available from the UN. That was likely to be after
Christmas.
155.
Dr Blix
told the Security Council on 19 December that, while
individual
governments
had stated they had evidence which contradicted Iraq’s denial
that
it had
weapons of mass destruction, UNMOVIC was not yet in a position to
give a
definitive
view.
156.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported overnight on 17/18 December that Dr Blix
would
tell the
Security Council on 19 December that it could not have confidence
that the
61
Minute
Miller to Manning, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq: WMD
Declaration’.
318