3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
context of
a need for the international community “to take action where we
need to take
action, but
you can’t do that just on the basis of the wish for regime
change”.237
622.
A brief
account of the outcome of the visit was provided in a telegram from
the
FCO on 10
April, providing additional points which Mr Ricketts had used in
briefing EU
Ambassadors.238
In relation
to Iraq, it stated:
“The Prime
Minister came away convinced that President Bush would act in
a
calm,
measured and sensible but firm way. There was no question of
precipitate
action. But
they agreed that Iraq’s WMD programmes were a major threat to
the
international
community, particularly when coupled with Saddam’s proven
track
record on
using these weapons. Letting that programme continue unhindered
was
not an
option. The Prime Minister and President Bush agreed that action in
the UN
was the
priority. It was essential to get the weapons inspectors deployed
to begin
to assess
the extent of the Iraqi WMD programmes. The Prime Minister had
been
tough in
his demand that Saddam must let the inspectors back in: ‘any one,
any
time, any
place that the international community demands’.”
623.
Mr Straw
was concerned about the potential reaction in Parliament
to
developments
on Iraq.
624.
Mr Straw
advised that Parliament should be given a chance to vote
on
a substantive
motion before any military action.
625.
Mr Straw
warned Mr Blair that Lord Goldsmith had expressed
“serious
doubt”
about whether existing resolutions would provide “sufficient
cover”
for military
action.
626.
Mr Straw
also advised that Mr Blair should avoid being “pinned
down”
on whether
a new UN resolution would be required to provide the legal
basis
for military
action.
627.
Mr Straw
welcomed Mr Blair’s decision to make a statement to Parliament
about
the
discussions with President Bush but made a number of points in
relation to Iraq:
•
Mr Blair
should concede that any military action in Iraq should be decided
in a
debate on a
substantive motion in the House of Commons, not a debate on
the
adjournment.
This was “quite a point of principle with many in the
PLP”.
•
The shift
of focus to the re-admission of weapons inspectors was welcome
and
would
“greatly help in making the argument for military action if (as I
suspect)
Iraq fails
properly to comply”.
237
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 34-36.
238
Telegram 73
FCO London to Madrid, 10 April 2002, ‘The Prime Minister’s Meeting
with President Bush,
5-7
April’.
501