12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
589.
A JIC
Assessment on 11 November reported that the ISF had been attacked
by
insurgent
groups “since their creation” and cited “one of the most serious”
attacks on
23 October
where a convoy of ING forces was ambushed and 49 unarmed recruits
were
shot.535
In
describing the risk of infiltration, it stated:
“We judge
that all the Iraqi official institutions, including the security
forces … employ
individuals
who give information to the insurgents, whether willingly or under
threat.
We estimate
that nearly a third of current police officers will in time have to
be
dismissed
due to their unsuitability, many of whom are believed to co‑operate
with
insurgents.
In Basra the police chief has been sacked … Some attacks, such as
the
murders of
high profile officials, suggest insider knowledge. But insurgents
are also
able to
intimidate or attack the security forces simply because they live
in and are
known among
the local community.”
590.
On 26
November, MOD officials advised Mr Hoon that the ISF had
performed well
during
operations in Fallujah (see Section 9.3) and that the development
of the ISF was
“on
track”.536
Many ISF
elements were “above the predicted capability” for 1
December.
Although
absenteeism remained a problem, it was being addressed, including
through
“greater
use of posting away from home areas to avoid intimidation”. The
minute asked
Mr Hoon
to note that:
“ISF tasks
during [the Fallujah operation] were deliberately selected so as
not to
be too
demanding. That most of Fallujah was virtually deserted made ISF
follow up
operations
easier; and the insurgents made little concerted attempt to disrupt
them.
It is not
surprising therefore that [the Fallujah operation] did not reveal
any significant
gaps in ISF
capability, training or equipment. It was never intended so to
do.”
591.
On 20 August
2004, Mr Phillipson wrote to Mr George Fergusson, OD
Sec,
commissioning
a paper that set out the full picture in Iraq.537
It was to
cover how Iraq
could
progress to successful elections in January 2005, the challenges
faced and “initial
thoughts”
on how those challenges could be addressed.
592.
The IPU
produced the paper, which concluded that the strategy agreed by
the
DOP in July
remained the right one but would need “regular fine
tuning”.538
On
SSR,
the IPU
suggested that timescales for Iraqiisation could “be compressed …
but only
with
increased resources and at risk to quality”. Equipment supply had
started “to flow”
but
momentum would need to be maintained and in‑country distribution
improved.
535
JIC
Assessment, 11 November 2004, ‘Iraq Security – Current
Concerns’.
536
Minute MOD
[junior official] to APS/SofS [MOD], 26 November 2004, ‘Post
Fallujah – an Assessment of
ISF
Performance’.
537
Letter
Phillipson to Fergusson, 20 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
538
Minute
Crompton to Private Secretary [FCO], 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’ attaching Paper Iraq
Policy
Unit, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps: Action
Points’.
185