The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

213. Ms Kara Owen, Mr Straw’s Private Secretary, wrote to Sir David Manning on

20 March, advising that the US envisaged that control of the OFF programme would

pass from the UN Secretary-General to “authorities in Iraq” within 90 days.114 Ms Owen

advised that that short time-scale suggested that the US was thinking that control

over the OFF programme should be handed over to either Coalition Forces or a

non‑representative interim administration established by the US rather than, as the UK

wanted, a credible representative Iraqi Government. The US proposal was likely to run

into major objections in the Security Council, and would be likely to be perceived as an

attempt to “grab Iraqi oil”.

214. Ms Owen suggested that Sir David might need to discuss the issue soon with

Dr Rice.

215. Mr Bowen circulated draft ‘British Post-Conflict Objectives’ to senior officials in the

FCO, the MOD and DFID on 25 March.115 The text incorporated earlier comments from

some departments.

216. The draft stated:

“With others, we will help revive the Iraqi economy and assist reform by:

• working with the UN to manage Iraq’s oil revenues in order to achieve the

maximum benefit for the Iraqi people in an accountable and transparent

manner …”

217. There is no indication whether the objectives were ever adopted formally.

218. Resolution 1472 (2003) was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council

on 28 March.116 The resolution gave the UN Secretary-General authority to purchase

medical supplies and Iraqi goods and services under the OFF programme, for a period

of 45 days (until 10 May). The resolution did not give the UN Secretary-General authority

to sell Iraqi oil.

219. The UK Government’s view was that until sanctions on Iraq were lifted or the

Security Council agreed a further resolution amending the OFF programme, the

Coalition did not have the power to export Iraqi oil.117

220. Section 9.1 describes the UK’s efforts to develop a resolution which would further

extend the OFF programme and authorise the UN Secretary-General to sell Iraqi oil and

buy the full range of humanitarian supplies.

114 Letter Owen to Manning, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Oil for Food’.

115 Letter Bowen to Chaplin, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post Conflict Objectives’ attaching Paper [draft],

25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: British Post-Conflict Objectives’.

116 UN Security Council Resolution 1472 (2003).

117 Paper IPU, 22 April 2003, ‘Oil/Energy policy for Iraq’.

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