The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
90.
The AHGI
agreed that the DEFRA paper should be passed to the US, and
a
finalised
version sent to Ministers.
91.
Sections 6.1
and 6.2 describe how, by the beginning of January 2003,
uncertainty
about
Turkey’s agreement to the deployment of Coalition ground forces in
its territory
had reached
a critical point, and the UK’s decision to deploy large-scale
ground forces
to the
south, rather than the north, of Iraq.
92.
The MOD’s
Strategic Planning Group advised the Chiefs of Staff on 7 January
that
adopting a
southern option had the potential to:
“Provide UK
with leading role in key areas of Iraq (free of Kurdish political
risks)
in
Aftermath, and thus provide leverage in Aftermath Planning efforts,
especially
related
to:
•
Humanitarian
effort
•
Reconstruction
of key infrastructure
•
Future
control and distribution of Iraqi oil.”43
93.
Lieutenant
General John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), attended a
US
Central
Command (CENTCOM) commanders’ conference in Tampa, Florida on 15
and
16
January.44
The
conference was described by General Tommy Franks,
Commander
in Chief
CENTCOM, as “likely to be the last chance for such a gathering to
take place.
It therefore
had to be conclusive.”
94.
Lt Gen Reith
reported to Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence
Staff,
that the US
had “a zillion dollar project to modernise and properly exploit the
southern
95.
Gen Reith told
the Inquiry that, in the margins of the conference, he had
told
Gen Franks
that he was unhappy with the way planning was going:
“… they
were going into shock and awe, and we … the British … had been
very
much the
custodians of ‘Let’s worry about Phase IV’.46
So we got
on to Phase IV in
our
discussion and I made the point … that the oilfields were
absolutely essential for
Phase IV,
to provide revenue for Iraq for its reconstruction and therefore,
we needed
to secure
the oilfields rather than have them destroyed. I also made the
point to him
that the
more china that we broke, the more we would have to replace
afterwards.”47
43
Paper SPG,
7 January 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Military Strategic Analysis of
Pros/Cons of Adopting
a Southern
Land Force Option’.
44
Minute
Wilson to MA/CJO, 17 January 2003, ‘CENTCOM Component Commanders’
Conference:
15‑16 Jan
03’.
45
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 17 January 2003, ‘Discussion with General Franks
– 16 Jan 03’.
46
Phase IV
was the military term for the post-conflict phase of military
operations.
47
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 42-43.
388