1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
326.
The record of
Mr Blair’s discussions with President Putin in the margins of
the
G8 meeting
in Genoa on 21 July verifies Mr Blair’s and Mr Sawers’
accounts.178
The
priority
was to stop Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons. Mr Blair observed that
Iraq had
rejected
proposals to allow UN observers to return as a first step to
lifting sanctions,
and that
the proposals on the table were to move to interim arrangements
before UN
inspectors
returned and sanctions were lifted. In addition, the issue of
whether an
“outside
enemy” led to people “rallying round and allowed Saddam to justify
his strict
internal
regime” was raised. Mr Blair was concerned about the humanitarian
impact of
sanctions;
and that the situation in Iraq made stabilising the Middle East
more difficult.
Mr Sawers
concluded that Russia was looking for a way out of the
impasse.
327.
On 25 May, the
JIC assessed Saddam Hussein’s strategy and “the
continuing
erosion of
sanctions”.179
That
Assessment is addressed in the Box below.
The JIC
assumed, for the purposes of its Assessment, that there would be no
change to
the
existing sanctions regime until the end of the year. It did not
assess the prospects for
achieving
P5 unity and the UK’s “new approach” in that
timescale.
The JIC’s
Key Judgements included:
•
“Most
Governments around the world still respect UN
sanctions.
Around
80 percent
of Iraq’s overall revenues are controlled through [the]
Oil-for-Food
[programme]
… There is broad international consensus to maintain the
arms
embargo
at least as
long as Saddam [Hussein] remains in power. This
severely
limits
Iraq’s ability to re-build its military threat.”
•
“Nevertheless,
the effectiveness of sanctions continues to erode …
Iraq’s
illicit
earnings are likely to exceed US$3bn this year …”
•
Syria, Jordan
and Turkey benefited “from cheap Iraqi oil and associated
trade
with Iraq.
In the absence of compensation or P5 unity, they will remain
reluctant
to support
revised sanctions or allow closer monitoring of
trade.”
Regional
support for
revising sanctions would be “increasingly difficult to achieve”
as
Iraq
extended “trade benefits to more Arab states” and the Palestinian
crisis
continued.
•
“…
Russia
blocked a
revised UN sanctions regime because it believed its
trade
prospects
would be severely curtailed. But Russia may not feel able to stand
in
the way of
a further resolution on sanctions.”
•
“Iraq’s
isolation has diminished … Wider Arab
sympathy for Iraq is bolstered
by Saddam’s
championing of Palestinian rights, the widespread Arab
perception
178
Letter
Sawers to McDonald, 21 July 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s bilateral with
President Putin, Genoa,
21 July –
Iraq’.
179
JIC
Assessment, 25 July 2001, ‘Iraq: Continuing Erosion of
Sanctions’.
253