3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
581.
The
preparation of a Written Answer on 17 March, setting out Lord
Goldsmith’s
view of the
legal basis for military action, is also addressed in Section
5.
582.
A paper for
publication providing examples of Iraq’s failure to comply
with
the
obligations imposed by the UN was produced by the FCO on 15
March.
583.
The question
of what would constitute a further material breach as specified
in
OP4 of
resolution 1441 (2002) was the subject of considerable debate
within the UK
Government
in late 2002 (see Section 3.6).
584.
In January
2003, Mr Blair said that, if the inspectors’ reports
established a pattern
of
non-compliance, they would, in the absence of other evidence that
Iraq had concealed
WMD (a
“smoking gun”), be sufficient to secure Security Council support
for a second
resolution
stating that Iraq was in further material breach of resolution
1441.194
585.
Mr Blair
proposed that the US and UK should seek to persuade others,
including
Dr Blix,
that this was the “true view” of resolution 1441.
586.
By the end of
January, Mr Blair had taken a public position that Iraq was
failing
fully to
comply with resolution 1441, and that that was a further material
breach (see
Section
3.6).
587.
In his advice
of 7 March, Lord Goldsmith said that the views of UNMOVIC and
the
IAEA would
be highly significant in demonstrating hard evidence of
non-compliance and
588.
In his minute
to Mr Blair of 11 March, Mr Straw wrote that
the:
“… three
recent meetings of the [Security] Council more than fulfil the
requirement
for
immediate consideration of reports of non-compliance. So we can
say
convincingly
that the process set out in resolution 1441 is
complete.”196
589.
Mr Straw
suggested that the UK Government should use “the
overwhelming
evidence
that Iraq has not used the four months” since the adoption of
resolution 1441
“to
co-operate ‘immediately, unconditionally and actively’” to make a
“more compelling”
case to
Parliament and public opinion. The UNMOVIC “clusters” document
would be
a material
help in making that case”.
590.
A draft of the
FCO paper on Iraq’s failure to comply with resolution 1441,
intended
to
“demonstrate clearly the extent of Iraqi intransigence” was sent to
Mr Straw’s Private
194
Letter
Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
195
Minute
Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution
1441’.
196
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: What if We Cannot
Win the Second Resolution?’
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