The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
908.
On 29 July, a
junior official from the MOD submitted a similar briefing to the
Private
Office of a
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Defence.860
The
official wrote:
“It has
become increasingly clear … that abuse in the Iraqi Security Forces
may be
far more
widespread than the specific incidents of which we are aware
suggest, with
reports now
beginning to reach the media. This raises two issues: what should
be
done to
address human rights abuses in Iraq – FCO are leading on this area;
and
the nature
of our wider involvement with the IPS?”
909.
The official
described work under way on tackling abuse and added:
“Although
instances of abuse by the IPS are ultimately a matter for the
Iraqi
Government,
our involvement in the training of the IPS … means that we may
be
judged by
the media and others to be culpable. Legally, we may also be at
risk if our
involvement
could be judged as directly assisting units that systematically
torture
detainees.”
910.
In his weekly
report on 28 August, DCC Smith highlighted that the CIU’s name
was
likely to
be changed to the National Information and Investigation Agency:
“The Iraqis
are not
‘keen’ on either ‘intelligence’ or ‘criminal’ in the
name.”861
He wrote
that a number
of officers
previously involved in corrupt or criminal behaviour remained
members of
the CIU and
that the unit’s training could not begin until they were removed by
the MOI.
There had
been no progress in investigating Mr Abbas Allawi’s
case.
On 16 June
2005, Dr Reid advised his colleagues in DOP(I)
that:
“…
considerable progress had been made on the development of the Iraqi
Security
Forces.
165,000 were now trained. There could be a drawdown in British
troop
numbers
starting at the beginning of 2006 … culminating in the middle of
that year.”862
On 20 July,
Dr Reid presented a paper to DOP(I) on transition in
Iraq.863
The
paper
suggested
that handover in Maysan and Muthanna would occur from March 2006,
with
Basra
slightly later in July 2006 (no specific date was given for Dhi
Qar). “Handover”
would see
Iraqis assuming security control of their province. The paper
described the
ISF in
MND(SE) as “fragile and untested” but made no reference to issues
of loyalty,
corruption
or abuse by ISF personnel. The failure to deliver an effective ISF
and wider
criminal
justice capability was seen as one of two key risks to transition
(the other being a
deterioration
in the security situation).
DOP(I)
agreed Dr Reid’s proposed approach on 21 July.864
860
Minute MOD
[junior official] to PS/USofS [MOD], 29 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Alleged
Abuse of Detainees
by the Iraqi
Police Service’.
861
Minute
Smith, 28 August 2005, ‘Weekly Report – Week Ending Sunday 28th
August 2005’.
862
Minutes, 16
June 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
863
Paper MOD,
20 July 2005, ‘Operational Transition in Iraq’.
864
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
262