Executive
Summary
875.
A government
must prepare for a range of scenarios, not just the best case,
and
should not
assume that it will be able to improvise.
876.
Where the UK
is the junior partner and is unable during planning or
implementation
to secure the outcome it requires, it should take stock of whether
to
attach
conditions to continued participation and whether further
involvement would be
consistent
with the UK’s strategic interest.
877.
Public
statements on the extent of the UK’s ambition should reflect a
realistic
assessment
of what is achievable. To do otherwise is to risk even greater
disillusionment
and a loss
of UK credibility.
878.
Departmental
priorities and interests will inevitably continue to diverge
even
where an
inter‑departmental body with a cross‑government role, currently
the
Stabilisation
Unit (SU), is in place. Therefore, co‑operation between departments
needs
continual
reinforcement at official and Ministerial levels.
879.
The Head of
the SU must be sufficiently senior and the SU enjoy
recognition
inside and
outside government as a centre of excellence in its field if the
Unit is to have
credibility
and influence in No.10, the National Security Council, the
Treasury, the FCO,
DFID and
the MOD, and with the military.
880.
After the fall
of a repressive regime, steps inevitably have to be taken to
prevent
those
closely identified with that regime from continuing to hold
positions of influence
in public
life. The development of plans which minimise undesired
consequences,
which are
administered with justice and which are based on a robust
understanding
of the
social context in which they will be implemented, should be an
essential part
of
preparation for any post‑conflict phase. This should include
measures designed to
address
concerns within the wider population, including those of the
victims of the old
regime, and
to promote reconciliation.
881.
It is vital to
define carefully the scope of such measures. Bringing too many or
too
few
individuals within scope of measures like de‑Ba’athification can
have far‑reaching
consequences
for public sector capacity and for the restoration of public trust
in the
institutions
of government.
882.
It is also
important to think through the administrative implications of
the
measures to
be applied and the process for their implementation.
883.
The potential
for abuse means that it is essential to have thought‑through forms
of
oversight
that are as impartial and non‑partisan as possible.
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