The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
771.
Ahead of the
arrival of the US SOFA negotiating team in Baghdad in
mid-February,
Lt Gen
Rollo reported that MNF-I was focused on retaining four key
authorities within
Iraq:
•
the ability
to train and equip the ISF;
•
contractor
immunities and privileges;
•
the power
to detain; and
•
“full
spectrum operations”.
772.
All four of
these were seen as “essential to mission success”. Lt Gen
Rollo
reported
acceptance that the SOFA might need to be wrapped into a wider
political and
economic
agreement.
773.
On 3 February,
officials produced a discussion paper for MND(SE)
entitled
‘Maintaining
the Accommodation, Reducing IDF’.374
They
explained that, compared with
early 2007,
the attack figures remained “very modest” but that the upward trend
required
attention,
and possibly a “tuning” of strategy and tactics.
774.
A number of
“carrots and sticks” were proposed in the paper, including
releases
from US
detention, supplying intelligence on attackers to the ISF,
political engagement,
interdiction,
a show of force, persuading Muqtada al-Sadr to extend his
cease-fire,
reducing
Iranian influence and visible development activity.
775.
The paper
concluded: “It may well be that … a confrontation between JAM
and
the ISF is
inevitable. But our sense is that the longer the majority of JAM
fighters can
be persuaded
to go without the stimulus and status of regular combat, the weaker
the
force will
be.”
776.
On 4 February,
Sir John Scarlett wrote to Mr Miliband with an “update from
the
ground”
following a recent visit to Iraq.375
It included
the situation in the South. Although
there had
been some interest in re-creating the effect elsewhere in Iraq, the
US was:
“…
suspicious of our Shia engagement in the South, which, despite its
parallels to
the CLC
programme, they see as allowing Iranian influence to
expand.”
“Although
Basra province is relatively quiet, the political and military
situation is still
fragile and
the risk of significant further conflict remains … [JAM1] appears
to be
exerting a
positive influence in Basra. But some Sadrist hardline militants,
probably
no more
than 2-300 strong, continue to defy the accommodation and attack
UK
Forces. IDF
into the COB is showing a spike. If it ramps up significantly HMG
has
few levers
of influence. Development and economic projects might improve
the
374
Email
government official working closely with the military, 4 February
2008, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
Act 2’
attaching ‘Discussion Paper: Maintaining the Accommodation,
Reducing IDF’.
375
Letter C to
Secretary of State [FCO], 4 February 2008, ‘Iraq: An Update From
The Ground’.
324