The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

a day or less). It would be very damaging for the ITG if electricity supply that summer

was worse than the last.169

293. The record of the video conference did not include any reference to a discussion

on improving power supply, or reconstruction more broadly.170

294. Mr Blair spoke to Prime Minister Ja’afari for the first time on 26 May and said that

“we stood ready to help in any way we could”, in particular on developing the ISF.171

295. The newly formed Sub-Committee of the Ministerial Committee on Defence and

Overseas Policy on Iraq (DOP (I)) met for the first time on 26 May, chaired by Mr Blair.172

Mr Benn attended the meeting.

296. Mr Benn’s briefing for the meeting advised that, following his decision in December

2004 on priorities for 2005, DFID’s programme was now “substantially re-orientated

towards bilateral infrastructure support in the South”.173

297. It also advised that in response to a larger-than-expected charge from the FCO for

life support costs and a “smaller-than-expected” budget allocation for Iraq for 2005/06:

“… we have trimmed back some work, notably consultancy, and are planning

25 percent slippage on the £40m infrastructure work [DFID’s Iraq Infrastructure

Services Programme – IISP]. We are also seeking co-financing, with US$20m

agreed in principle with the World Bank …”

298. Even after that trimming, planned expenditure for 2005/06 exceeded the budget;

DFID would need to monitor spending very closely. It was, however, reasonable to

“over‑programme” given the (unspecified) “uncertainties” and the potential military

drawdown in the second half of 2005/06, which might significantly affect what DFID

could do in the South.

299. The Inquiry has seen no indications that other departments were informed of or

consulted on the decision to slip expenditure on the IISP.

300. Mr Blair’s briefing for the meeting, which was produced by the Cabinet Office,

recommended that he focus on three issues:

• combating the insurgency;

• improving the effectiveness of international assistance; and

• getting media messages right, both within and outside Iraq.174

169 Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 19 May 2005, ‘VTC with President Bush, 1220 19 May’.

170 Letter Quarrey to Siddiq, 19 May 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Video-Conference with Bush, 19 May’.

171 Letter Quarrey to Siddiq, 26 May 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with Ja’afari’.

172 Minutes, 26 May 2005, DOP(I) meeting.

173 Minute DFID [junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 24 May 2005, ‘Iraq Update, 25 May’ attaching

Briefing MENAD, 24 May 2005, ‘Iraq Update 25 May Background Note’.

174 Briefing Cabinet Office, 25 May 2005, ‘Chairman’s Brief (DOP(I))’.

244