9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
the
withdrawal of British troops from Iraq and the halting of their
deployment to Baghdad,
assumed to
be a reference to the Black Watch.
Based on
video evidence, it was thought probable that Mrs Hassan had been
murdered
by her
captors in November.88
In the UK
one commentator suggested that Mrs Hassan’s kidnapping exposed
the
continuing
“absence of basic law and order in the Sunni enclaves in central
Iraq”.89
The
fact that
Iraqi citizens who had been glad to be rid of Saddam Hussein were
now turning
to
extremists in the hope of restoring the basic fabric of life was
“an indictment of the way
the
post-Saddam transition has been carried out by the allies: not
enough troops on the
ground and
an administration content to hide inside the heavily-protected
Green Zone”.
The UK’s
emergency response mechanism, COBR, was activated in relation to
both
kidnappings.
Its activities are not described here, both because the Inquiry’s
terms of
reference
do not cover detailed investigation of individual cases, and in
order not to
prejudice
COBR’s future work in similar cases.
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry:
“I don’t
think anybody could have been ignorant of the dangers of living and
working
in Iraq at
that time … I think that most of the people who went out there
would have
been well
aware of what the problems were and would only have gone if they
had
taken the
necessary precautions in terms of their own security
…” 90
In an
update sent to Gen Walker on 26 September, Lt Gen McColl observed
that:
“Kidnapping
is ‘headline news’ due to the UK/US hostages. It is however not a
spike,
but a
constant in Iraq at present, with most kidnaps inspired by monetary
gain rather
than being
political/terrorist related.” 91
175.
Mr Blair spoke
by telephone to Prime Minister Allawi on 3 October, who
was
hopeful of
reaching agreement that foreign fighters would be told to leave
Fallujah by
local
leaders.92
They would
be given three days to do so.
176.
At the end of
his record of the conversation, Mr Phillipson wrote: “we will need
to
assess
tomorrow the prospects for a deal in Fallujah … and the
consequences if the
foreign
fighters do not leave”.
177.
In his weekly
report on 3 October Lt Gen McColl expressed concern to Gen
Walker
about the
timing of the full offensive operation being planned against
Fallujah, while
agreeing
that Fallujah was “a cancer that must be dealt
with”.93
88
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 16 November 2004,
‘Iraq- Kidnap of
Margaret
Hassan’.
89
The
Scotsman, 20
October 2004, The
kidnapping goes on.
90
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, page 99.
91
Minute
McColl to [CJO], 26 September 2004, ‘Report 130 of 26 September
04’.
92
Letter
Phillipson to Owen, 3 October 2004, ‘Phonecall with Prime Minister
Allawi, 3 October’.
93
Minute
McColl to CDS, 3 October 2004, ‘Report 131 of 3 Oct
04’.
425