9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
which
positions them more strongly is Basra”. However, “al-Sadr is
notoriously volatile
and it
would be unwise to count on his indefinite support for any
deal”.
“Prime
Minister Maliki is briefed on MND(SE)’s negotiation with [JAM1] and
has
raised no
objection. Maliki places a high premium on stability in Basra.
However,
he probably
has reservations about any deals with JAM and there is a risk
that
he could
miscalculate: an order for ISF to confront JAM directly in Basra
could upset
the
negotiation.”
564.
Under the
heading “Prospects”, the JIC judged:
“The
attitude of the Sadrist leadership … is also likely to be coloured
by their
perception
of the prospects for some lasting political gain, at least until
provincial
elections
take place next year. But we judge that JAM views locally and
nationally
are also
likely to be coloured by their perception of MNF intentions in the
longer
term …
If JAM conclude that momentum towards complete withdrawal has
stalled,
we judge
they might well resume such attacks. They would almost certainly
have
Iranian
support in doing so.”
565.
Mr Browne’s
visit to Basra prompted Maj Gen Binns to evaluate progress
made
since the
summer.264
On 1
November he wrote:
“We are now
subject to far fewer attacks, are constructively engaged with
the
Governor …
and the Provincial Council, we transit through Basra in force …
without
opposition
(although there is always a quantifiable threat) and are looking to
make
more of the
large amount of reconstruction work we are responsible for (through
US
resources)
in Basra … We are still subject to attack (and the danger is
significant),
but these
attacks are, we believe, from rogue elements (possibly sponsored by
Iran).
The
mainstream militias are for the most part quiet – unless provoked,
as we saw
on 23
October.
“Discussions
are taking place in Basra, without our involvement, between
political
parties and
JAM. We are also encouraging constructive engagement between
the
Iraqi
Security Forces and the Provincial Council. I am in no doubt that
encouraging,
cajoling
and supporting the various parties in Basra towards a peaceful
resolution
to their
differences will lay the foundations for Basra’s future prosperity
and success
for the
MND(SE) mission … But we should be in no doubt that this progress
is
not yet
irreversible and, should there be any backsliding by local parties,
we must
hold
our nerve as the groundswell of Iraqi opinion is moving
towards reconciliation
264
Minute
Binns to CJO, 1 November 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
1 November 2007’.
287