11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
In early
2002, the Defence Intelligence Staff estimated Ba’ath Party
membership within
Iraq at
between 600,000 and 700,000 individuals, which represented 4
percent of the
population.
There were several tiers of membership, reflecting individual
members’ roles
within the
party hierarchy. Membership was essential to reach senior positions
in the
military,
the government or in professional life.
4.
As described
in Section 6.5, although it was widely assumed that a process
for
removing
senior members of the Ba’ath Party from positions of power would be
required
after the
invasion, no clear plan for the de‑Ba’athification of Iraq’s public
sector had been
agreed
between the US and UK at the point the invasion was
launched.
5.
Because of the
extent to which the Ba’ath Party was intertwined with
Iraq’s
bureaucracy,
the failure of the US and UK to agree an approach to
de‑Ba’athification
compounded
uncertainty about how the bureaucracy might perform after
Saddam
Hussein’s
departure.
6.
As Coalition
Forces entered Iraq in March 2003, Ministers were supplied with
a
‘script’ to
use in media and Parliamentary discussion which set out the UK
vision for
“Phase IV”,
the reconstruction of Iraq.2
The script
said:
“When
conditions in Iraq permit, the US Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Affairs
(ORHA) will move to Baghdad and take on the supervision of the
civil
administration
of Iraq … We hope that the vast majority of the Iraqi public sector
will
remain in
place and be able to carry on its work …”
7.
On 4 April, a
Private Secretary to Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary,
supplied
Mr Matthew
Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
with six papers
on post‑conflict
Iraq.3
One covered
the Iraqi civil service, and stated:
“We do not
have any deep knowledge about which levels of the administration
are
so highly
politicised as to need immediate reform, nor which individuals
might have
to be
retired or stood down. This in any case cannot realistically be
assessed until
after
liberation.”
8.
The question
of what future strength and support the Ba’ath Party would
command
within Iraq
was raised by Mr Colin Burgon in a House of Commons debate on
7 April.4
2
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Core
Script’.
3
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 4 April 2003, ‘Post‑conflict Iraq: UK/US’ attaching
Paper, 4 April 2003, ‘The state
of the
Iraqi civil service and bureaucracy’.
4
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 April
2003, columns 29‑30.
3