3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
There was
“no other alternative” to seeking the exile of Saddam Hussein
and,
if that
failed, “his disarmament by force”.
•
Containment
“failed when the inspectors had to leave in 1998”.
Three
Permanent
Members of the Security Council had failed to support
resolution
1284 (1999)
which had been an attempt to offer Iraq “a new way to
peaceful
disarmament
while containing the threat”. Iraq had said no. The inspectors
were
not allowed
to return; sanctions were eroded, “and containment was left
weaker
than
ever”.
•
The
strategy encapsulated in resolution 1441 (2002) was “for the
active
disarmament
of the regime, backed by a credible threat of force”.
•
There was “no
automaticity about the use of force”; “it was entirely
conditional
on Saddam
Hussein’s compliance or otherwise with the
resolution”.
•
“We also
said – to our five permanent colleagues that if the only issue
between
us and them
over the ultimatum was more time than the 10 days we
had
allowed, of
course we could negotiate more time. But no country … has
been
prepared to
say how much more time should be allowed before time runs
out.
None of
them is prepared to issue an ultimatum. In reality, they are not
asking
for more
time. They are asking for time without end.”
•
Saddam
Hussein would not disarm peacefully, so the choice was “either
to
leave
Saddam where he is, armed and emboldened, an even bigger threat
to
his
country, his region and international peace and security, or we
disarm him
by force”.
“… of
course there will be consequences if the House approves the
Government
motion. Our
forces will almost certainly be involved in military action. Some
will be
killed; so,
too, will innocent Iraqi civilians, but far fewer Iraqis in the
future will be
maimed,
tortured or killed by the Saddam regime. The Iraqi people will
begin to
enjoy the
freedom and prosperity that should be theirs. The world will become
a
safer
place, and, above all, the essential authority of the United
Nations will have
been
upheld.”
941.
The amendment
to the Government motion was defeated by 396 to 217
votes.
942.
The Government
motion was approved by 412 to 149 votes.
943.
Mr Blair
did not argue that Iraq posed an imminent threat. He stated that
the
threat
which Saddam Hussein’s arsenal posed to “British citizens at home
and
abroad”
could not be contained, and that in the hands of the Iraqi regime
or in
the hands
of the terrorists to whom Saddam Hussein “would give his
weapons”,
they posed
“a clear danger to British citizens”.
944.
It was the
ingrained belief of the UK Government and the
intelligence
community
that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and
biological
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