9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
191.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were:
“I. The
security situation in Multi‑National Division (South-East)
(MND(SE)) has
deteriorated,
although attacks account for only around 3 percent of the national
total:
much lower
than in Baghdad and Sunni areas of central and northern
Iraq.
“II. Shia
militias, particularly militant elements of Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM),
are the most
potent
threat. Their violence remains mainly directed against the
Multi‑National
Forces
(MNF), but a range of Shia militias and criminal gangs has also
been
involved in
a campaign of violence and intimidation against Sunnis. As the
declining
MNF
presence reduces the number of coalition targets elsewhere across
the South,
some Shia
extremists will concentrate their efforts against MNF consolidating
in
Basra.
Intra‑Shia violence will also increase.
“III. The
threat from Sunni Arab nationalist insurgents and jihadists remains
low
across the
South. Their capabilities are limited and most attacks target to
Iraqi
Security
Forces (ISF) or the Shia. Nevertheless, occasional large‑scale
attacks,
including
suicide bombings, will continue.
…
“V. The
willingness and ability of the Iraq Army in the South to tackle
Shia militias is
doubtful.
Some army personnel retain loyalties to JAM and Badr militias. We
do not
know the
scale of this problem, although it is less severe than in the
police. In Basra
the police
are plagued by corruption, poor leadership and the entrenched
influence
of Shia
militias.
“VI. The
ability of the coalition to influence events is decreasing as
transition
proceeds.
Stability in the South will be affected by external events:
sustained MNF
action
against JAM in Baghdad could lead to sympathetic violence in the
south.
Maliki has
been persuaded to endorse short‑term coalition action in Basra,
more
limited in
scope than originally planned. But it remains uncertain whether
the
Iraqi authorities
have the necessary will or capacity to maintain progress over
the
long
term.”
192.
The JIC
considered that Iran wanted “to speed MNF withdrawal from the
South”
and
therefore wanted “to make life as difficult as possible for
coalition forces so long as
they
remain”. To that end, Iran was “prepared to risk some increased
instability” in Iraq.
The JIC
confirmed its earlier judgement that “the Iranians are providing
more training
and better
weaponry to some Shia extremists attacking the MNF”.
193.
The JIC
assessed that “considerable numbers of militant JAM groups in the
region
receive
either financial support, weapons or training from Iran” and there
was one
report that
suggested there had been a recent increase in support from
Hizballah to
Shia militants.
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