The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
shortfall of 17 vehicles would be met by Bulldog in the short term
“to provide
the best
protection available”, although this could “have a negative effect
on
Baswaris
and ISF consent”.407
767.
The junior
official’s advice recognised that re‑allocating Mastiff vehicles
to
MiTTing
would “inevitably incur greater risk elsewhere” but that PJHQ and
GOC
MND(SE)
considered that “to be acceptable”. The use of Vector vehicles
would
be
restricted to lower threat areas where the risk was “manageable”
and would be
subject to
“a continuous MND(SE) intelligence‑based threat assessment” based
on
Maj Gen White‑Spunner’s
recommendation.
768.
The advice
recognised that the decision to deploy Vector would reduce the
number
of vehicles
in Afghanistan’s regeneration pool but that was seen as “manageable
in the
short
term”.408
If the
consent for using Bulldog vehicles in the MiTT role
deteriorated
“to an
unacceptable level”, Mastiff vehicles planned for Afghanistan could
be diverted
to Iraq,
albeit creating a delay of one to two months for Mastiff vehicles
to reach
Afghanistan.
The impact of using Bulldog vehicles in a MiTT role would be
assessed
at the
end of July.
769.
Mr Browne
was advised that industry could not produce “an adequately
protected
vehicle” in
less than six to nine months. Ridgback vehicles were being
procured
for
Afghanistan but the earliest those could be deployed was “early
2009” and the
provisional
timeline for completing MiTTing in Iraq was May 2009 (see Section
12.1).
DCRS had
advised that the Treasury was “most unlikely to fund a new vehicle
or
modifications
to existing vehicles” given the timelines.
770.
On
presentation, the junior official warned that as Vector was
“originally procured
to meet a
lesser threat” in Afghanistan, it had “considerably lower levels of
ballistic
protection
than either Mastiff or Bulldog”. That potentially meant that
“accusations could
be
levelled” that Vector was “providing unacceptably low levels of
protection to UK
forces”. A
handling plan was being developed to address that.
771.
On the same
day, Mr Browne’s Private Secretary replied to an MOD official,
stating
that
Mr Browne had discussed the note with HQ MND(SE) and was “not
clear” that
Maj Gen White‑Spunner’s
intent on the use of Vector was “indeed as set
out”.409
407
Note
DJC [junior
official] to APS/SofS [MOD], 22 May 2008, ‘Iraq: MND(SE) Military
Transition Team
Concept –
Provision of Protected Mobility’.
408
Email
DJC‑Sec‑7 to SofS‑PS, 22 May 2008, ‘FW: 20080521 – TELIC – MiTT PM
plan MinSub v1
2 – SUKEO’.
This email clarified that the number of Vector vehicles being
damaged and destroyed in
Op HERRICK
had reduced and would continue to reduce as new PPVs were rolled
out to Afghanistan
and the
“reliance on Vector in the higher threat areas”
lessened.
409
Email
PS/SofS [MOD] to DJC‑Sec7, 22 May 2008, ‘RE: 20080521 – TELIC –
MiTT PM plan
MinSub v1 2
– SUKEO’.
132