1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
576.
Mr Butler
concluded that:
•
Disarmament
of Iraq’s proscribed missile and chemical weapons was
“possibly
near its
end”, but a “satisfactory resolution” of the questions on VX would
be
necessary.
•
This was
not the case for biological weapons where Iraq’s declarations
were
“neither
credible nor verifiable” and it had “failed to take” the
opportunity to
disclose
its activities.
•
Development
of monitoring was “vital to the future”, but Iraq was
permitting
activity
“only at a less than satisfactory level”. Monitoring would be
particularly
important
if UNSCOM was unable to provide 100 per cent verification of
items
unilaterally
destroyed by Iraq.
•
Full
disclosure of materials and information was the “crucial ingredient
for both
an end to
the disarmament process and future monitoring”. Iraq’s demands
that
UNSCOM
should prove that Iraq continued to possess prohibited weapons
and
associated
capabilities would, if accepted, “reverse the onus of disclosure
clearly
placed on
Iraq by the Security Council”.
577.
In his report
of 7 October, Dr ElBaradei confirmed that there was no
evidence
or indications
of prohibited activity at sites inspected before Iraq’s decision of
5 August
to cease
co-operation.231
There were
still some difficulties, including Iraq’s instructions
that
personnel should not respond to any questions about Iraq’s
clandestine nuclear
programme,
the quality of Iraq’s declarations. Greater transparency “would
contribute
considerably
to clarifying the few remaining questions and
concerns”.
578.
These issues
“would not of themselves prevent the full implementation” of
the
Agency’s
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV). That
was:
“…
predicated on the assumption that Iraq has the knowledge and
technical
expertise
to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials
or
technology
to which it may gain access in the future. Nonetheless, it must
be
recognised
that Iraq’s direct acquisition of weapon-usable material would
present
a serious
technical challenge to OMV measures, and great reliance must
continue
to be
placed on international controls.”
579.
Following
informal consultations in the Security Council on 13 October,
Mr Butler
submitted
an experts’ report of the findings from analysis of special missile
warhead
fragments
excavated in Iraq to the President of the Security Council on
26 October.232
231
UN Security
Council, 7 October 1998, ‘Sixth consolidated report of the
Director General of the
International
Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council
resolution 1051 (1996)’
(S/1998/927).
232
UN Security
Council, 26 October 1998, ‘Letter dated 26 October 1998
from the Executive Chairman of
the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to President of the Security
Council’ (S/1998/995).
131