3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

was “genuinely dangerous only if it has the capabilities to commit aggression, if it

has the capabilities to attack”.37 The “problem was to make sure it no longer had

those capabilities or … that those capabilities could be controlled and destroyed”.

The inspections regime between 1991 and 1998 had destroyed more weapons than the

Gulf Conflict in 1991, and “resulted in the complete, almost complete eradication in all

likelihood … of Iraq’s nuclear programmes”. Iraq’s (Al Samoud 2) missiles with a longer

than permitted range were “being destroyed”.

126. President Chirac acknowledged that there were “probably other weapons” but

Dr Blix had told the Security Council that if Iraq stepped up co-operation, which was

“never sufficient but which has improved”, weapons of mass destruction could be

eliminated. It was for the inspectors to advise whether they could complete their task.

If they reported that they were not in a position to guarantee Iraq’s disarmament, it

would be:

“… for the Security Council alone to decide the right thing to do. But in that case …

regrettably, the war would become inevitable. It isn’t today.”

127. President Chirac stated that other regimes, such as North Korea, had nuclear

weapons which were “not hypothetical”, but definitely existed.

128. President Chirac stated that the international community had unanimously chosen

the path of disarming Iraq; it had not decided the objective was to change the Iraqi

regime; and that:

“Today nothing tells us that this path is a dead end and, consequently, it must be

pursued since war is always a final resort, always an acknowledgement of failure,

always the worse solution … And we don’t consider we are at that point. That is

why we are refusing to embark on a path automatically leading to war so long as

the inspectors haven’t told us: ‘we can’t do any more’ … they are telling us the

opposite.”

129. President Chirac argued that the “new resolution setting an ultimatum” represented

a move from a course of action involving the pursuit of inspections in order to

disarm Iraq to “a different one consisting of saying: ‘in so many days, we go to war’”.

France would not accept “that solution”.

130. In response to a series of questions, President Chirac stated:

• “So the first scenario which is today, this evening, the most probable, is that this

resolution won’t get a majority of nine members …”

• “There will be nations who will vote ‘no’, including France … But … there won’t

be a majority. So there won’t be a veto problem.”

37 The Élysée, Interview télévisé de Jacques Chirac, le 10 mars 2003. A translation for HMG was produced

in a Note [unattributed], [undated], ‘Iraq – Interview given by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic,

to French TV (10 March 2003)’.

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