The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

114.  Mr Blair and Mr Hoon met Secretary Rumsfeld on 5 June.53 The record of the

discussion on Iraq confirmed that the US would begin discussions with the UK at the

military level.

115.  Mr Blair commented that “removing Saddam would be excellent for the Iraqi

people and for the Middle East region”, and that “The UK would be with the US in any

military action.” That would best be done “by ensuring a broad coalition of support and

acquiescence” and avoiding “unintended consequences” which might arise “if military

action occurred while the Arab world were hostile”.

116.  Regional countries would want the territorial integrity of Iraq maintained and to

know what the long-term plan for Iraq would be.

117.  Mr Blair expected Saddam Hussein to “play this cleverly, trying to draw us into

a debate about UN weapons inspectors etc”.

118.  Mr Blair told Mr Rumsfeld that he had “not yet decided about public handling”.

The UN inspectors would be “important for European opinion”. In Mr Blair’s view:

“Some would say that a further UNSCR would be required, but in the end they might …

accept a final demand for unconditional access for the inspectors. We had to avoid a

negotiation with Saddam … we would probably be in a better position with an ultimatum

that Saddam refused than with no ultimatum.” In his view “the WMD threat provided

a sufficient reason for action against Saddam” but building up “a public picture of the

history of the regime” would help convince European opinion of the need for action

against Saddam Hussein.

119.  Mr Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy Washington,

reported on 7 June that Mr Blair’s message at College Station to Saddam Hussein on

the weapons inspectors had “heavily influenced” the US views on the UK’s approach

towards inspections, “particularly in the NSC [National Security Council] and OSD [Office

of the Secretary of Defense]”; the US “assume we are on board for a tough approach”.54

53  Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 5 June 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with Rumsfeld, 5 June: Iraq’.

54  Telegram 778 Washington to FCO London, 7 June 2002, ‘Iraq: US/UK Talks, 13 June’.

24