4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
386.
The UK’s
intensive lobbying to secure support in the Security Council for a
second
resolution
on Iraq is described in Sections 3.7 and 3.8. It included a series
of visits to the
capitals of
many members of the Council.
387.
Mr Miller
informed Sir David Manning that a script was being prepared
which
would:
“… briefly
summarise evidence and judgements on Saddam’s WMD; describe
the
effect of
some of the agents; set out the Iraqi response to UNSCR 1441,
including
the flaws
in the 7 December declaration; and cover what we know of
concealment,
intimidation
of witnesses and other aspects of non-co-operation. It will also
provide
supporting
material on Saddam’s regime and – briefly – on links with
terrorism.
We will
update the pack as new material becomes available.”149
388.
On 26
February, Mr Miller provided a brief for Sir Jeremy Greenstock
to use in
Security
Council discussions, setting out the UK assessment of Iraq’s WMD
and its
response to
resolution 1441.150
389.
The brief
provided a very short summary of the judgements in the
September
dossier,
including that there had been recent production of chemical and
biological
agents;
that judgements on concealment had been borne out by events; that
the dossier
had
highlighted rocket motor casting chambers which UNMOVIC had now
proscribed;
and that
UNMOVIC had agreed that the al-Rafah engine test stand had “a
capability far
in excess
of what is needed for permitted missile systems”. The brief also
stated that
work on
anthrax “carried on late into 2002”.
390.
In relation to
Iraq’s response to resolution 1441, the brief stated:
“Saddam’s
behaviour since the middle of last year has been very
instructive.
We have
been watching closely as the story unfolds. What follows is
not
supposition.
It is what we know.”
391.
The points
made in the briefing included:
•
In April
2002, Qusay Hussein had issued instructions for the concealment
of
chemical
warfare agents.
•
In August
2002, “individual scientists and officials were made
personally
responsible
for the items on which they were working, holding them in
their
homes and
the homes of relatives and friends”.
•
By 20
November, all production work on banned weapons at
Military
Industrialisation
Commission sites had been stopped and evidence of
prohibited
activity
was being cleaned up.
149
Minute
Miller to Manning, 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing Foreign
Government’.
150
Letter
Miller to Greenstock, 26 February 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD
Brief’.
361