The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

it. However, it is equally clearly in our interests to see that they do do it, and that

our joint efforts are integrated properly within the overall coalition and Iraqi plan.

And properly resourcing that plan for the relatively short time that the Basrawis will

continue to require and want our help seems the only sensible course of action.”

832.  Maj Gen Rollo also reported that Gen Mohan had visited Baghdad in early March

to present his security strategy for Basra to Ministers and to Gen Petraeus. Gen

Petraeus had established a committee, chaired by the commander of MNSTC-I, to look

at how this plan might best be supported by MNF. Lt Gen Rollo commented that it would

continue to be in the UK’s interests to support Gen Mohan or his successor.

833.  President Ahmadinejad of Iran visited Baghdad in early March, the first time an

Iranian President had done so.406

834.  Lt Gen Rollo commented that, in the short term, the visit had presented another

handling challenge for Prime Minister Maliki as Iranian training and funding of terrorist

groups was widely known and resented, particularly by the Sunni community.407 The visit

resulted in seven co-operation agreements between Iran and Iraq on trade, transport,

insurance and industry.

835.  On 4 March, JAM1 was arrested by US forces in Baghdad.408 Officials reported

the following day that Maj Gen White-Spunner had raised the issue with Gen Petraeus,

explaining that the UK had difficulty with JAM1’s detention, to which Gen Petraeus

replied “Release him now.”

836.  Lt Gen Houghton briefed the Chiefs of Staff on 4 March that an Iraqi Vice President

had vetoed the Provincial Powers Law “on constitutional grounds” and that “the

possibility of a delay to the Provincial Elections timetable now existed”.409

837.  Reporting on the detail of General Mohan’s security strategy on 6 March,

Maj Gen White-Spunner commented that although MND(SE) supported the bid for

extra resources for Basra in order to “over face” JAM:

“We would not support Mohan developing this strategy into the prosecution of a

major urban battle for which he would need more IA troops than are likely to be

forthcoming given other coalition/ISF priorities …”410

838.  Mr Brown and Mr Browne had breakfast with the Chiefs of Staff on 6 March.411

On Iraq, the Chiefs told them that “there was quality in the ISF but it was not broadening

as rapidly as hoped, so training and mentoring of 14 Div remained a vital job”. The

406  BBC News, 2 March 2008, Iran leader in landmark Iraq trip.

407  Minute Rollo to CDS, 3 March 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (290) 2 Mar 08’.

408  Email government official working closely with the military, 5 March 2008, ‘Detention of [JAM1] […]

by US […]’.

409  Minutes, 4 March 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

410  Minute White-Spunner to CJO, 6 March 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 6 March 2008’.

411  Letter Fletcher to Rimmer, 6 March 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Breakfast with Chiefs of Staff, 6 March’.

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