12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
trained
Division. Our main focus will be to help resolve the following
concerns: a
lack of
situational awareness; a lack of clear command and control; poor
planning;
and an
inability to co‑ordinate effectively with coalition assets and
experience, in
particular
with regards to calling on coalition forces for fire support and in
extremis
extraction
when these can only be delivered within coalition rules of
engagement.”
1466.
On
presentation, the official wrote that there were “many potential
positives” but
it would be
likely to raise questions about whether the UK handed Basra over to
PIC too
early “and
whether we have acted too late and only under
pressure”.
1467.
The total
number of military personnel involved was 150.
1468.
In
Mr Browne’s absence, Mr Adam Ingram, the Minister for
Armed Forces,
considered
the advice on 3 April.1341
Mr Ingram
noted the advice and “emphasised the
need to
ensure that personnel are clearly briefed on the red lines beyond
which they
must not
operate and the action to be taken in the event such lines are
crossed”. He
“also asked
that any evidence of behaviour by Iraqi forces with which UK
personnel
had concerns
be reported rapidly to Ministers”.
1469.
A note for
Mr Browne was written on Mr Ingram’s response by
Mr Browne’s
Private
Secretary the same day.1342
He reported
that MiTTs were now deployed in Basra.
He
wrote:
“… It
wasn’t so long ago that MiTTs/OMLTs [Operational Mentoring Liaison
Teams]
in Iraq
were thought to be a bad idea, but then, the situation has
definitely changed
in the last
week or so …
“Everyone
appears to be content that the legal position is robust, but there
are
clearly
presentational risks in being seen to be drawn into town, while
Warrior
back in
Basra will not go unnoticed. It means 58 additional people will
be
deployed but
they’re temporary and will be invisible – we’re still at ‘around
4,000’
established
posts.”
1470.
Maj Gen White‑Spunner
reported on 3 April that US MiTTs and the
“accompanying
military resources they bring” were having a “significant
supporting
impact” to
those Iraqi forces.1343
1471.
On 4 April,
Mr Jon Day, MOD Director General Operational Policy,
advised
Ms Aldred
that there were over 400 US troops embedded with the Iraqi
reinforcements
sent to
Basra in support of Charge of the Knights.1344
1341
Minute
PS/Min(AF) to PJHQ [junior official], 3 April 2008, ‘Op TELIC:
Enhancing UK Operational
Support to
the Iraqi Army’.
1342
Manuscript
comment PS/SofS [MOD] on Minute PS/Min(AF) to PJHQ [junior
official], 3 April 2008,
‘Op TELIC:
Enhancing UK Operational Support to the Iraqi Army’.
1343
Minute
White‑Spunner to CJO, 3 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 3
April 2008’.
1344
Letter Day
to Aldred, 4 April 2008, ‘Military Plans for Basra’.
395