The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the need to
show “as quickly as possible that military action had brought
the
Iraqi
people a humanitarian benefit”; and
•
the need to
press the US that the UN “had to be centrally involved,
legitimising
the
international presence”.
846.
To address the
difficulties created by “the impression that the US was
determined
to go to
war come what may”, Mr Blair and Mr Aznar agreed the need
to pursue a
communications
strategy showing that they “were doing everything possible to
avoid
war”.
Mr Blair would also seek more public support from Denmark and
the Netherlands.
847.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries:
“Blix was
now causing us significant problems. He was talking now about
Saddam’s
line on
[potential decommissioning of] Al Samoud missiles being a
significant
piece of
disarmament. TB was raging again, said the man was supposed to be
a
civil
servant, but had decided to behave like a politician. He is just
desperate not
to be seen
as the person who allowed a war to start, but his job is to present
the
facts. He
felt Blix was being bullied successfully by the French who, he was
now
convinced,
wanted as their main foreign policy objective to build Europe as a
power
rival to
the US, and determined to shaft TB …”
“He was
also worried that Kofi [Annan] … was getting closer to the
Franco‑German
848.
At the end
of February, a senior official in the US Administration
sought
the UK’s
views on whether the resolution should be put to a vote or
withdrawn
if it was
judged that there was insufficient support for its
adoption.
849.
No.10 took
the view that it would want a vote.
850.
Following his
farewell calls in Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer
reported
that
Mr Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning in the State
Department, had
produced a
memorandum which challenged the conventional wisdom by suggesting
that
the second
resolution should be withdrawn if it was likely that it would not
be adopted;
and that
Secretary Powell would be interested in Mr Straw’s
views.261
851.
Sir
Christopher’s letter was also copied to Sir David Manning, Sir
Michael Jay,
and Sir
Jeremy Greenstock.
852.
Mr Powell
sought Mr Blair’s views, commenting that he had told
Mr Haass on
28 February
that the UK “would prefer to put the resolution to a vote and that,
“having
thought
about it”, that was “even more strongly” his view: “Refusing to put
this to the
vote and
claiming we had nine votes would hole us below the waterline.” In
addition,
260
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
261
Letter
Meyer to McDonald, 28 February 2002 [sic], ‘Iraq: Confronting a
French Veto’.
332