3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
that, while
the negotiations should “start tough”: “The final result will
almost
certainly
be less explicit.”
21.
Addressing the
tactics, Mr Straw wrote that the P5 lunch the previous day
had,
in the
words of Mr Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, been “a good
start on securing
a consensus”.
22.
Mr Straw
added that France’s approach of two resolutions was “attractive to
some
precisely
because it postpones any hard choices and gives Russia and France a
veto
on military
action. I think it a very dangerous idea.” It would postpone hard
choices and
give other
members of the P5 a veto over military action.
23.
Mr Straw
had argued to his Ministerial colleagues that “the tougher and
more
complete
the first resolution, the greater the chance of Iraqi compliance.
Paradoxically
… [a] two
resolution approach would make the use of force more likely,
because Iraq
would view
it as weak.”
24.
Mr Straw
wrote that he and Secretary Powell both believed that “we should
get a
long way
down the road of agreeing the strategy in capitals” with the P5
before putting
any draft
text into the Council. They envisaged that, after intensive
discussions, the
US and UK
would be “in a position to table proposals in the Security Council
early in
the week of
23 September”. He also suggested that there might be tactical
advantages
in the
UK tabling the resolution.
25.
Sir David
Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and the Head of the
Cabinet
Office
Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), sent the minute to
Mr Blair with his
own
comments on a number of points:
•
Mr Jacques
Chirac, the French President, would not accept the use of
the
phrase all
necessary measures “at this stage”.
•
A
declaration did not need to precede inspections: it could be
pursued in parallel.
•
The UK
dossier was “designed to show how unsatisfactory absolving
palaces
from
inspections has proved”.
•
Mr Straw’s
view that the negotiations should start tough but the
consequences
in the
event of non‑compliance would be less explicit than agreement to
“all
necessary
measures” looked “right.”7
26.
The UK was
concerned to avoid US proposals for a comprehensive
Iraqi
declaration
being used to provide the basis for military action before the
return
of inspectors.
7
Manuscript
comments Manning to Prime Minister on Minute Straw to Prime
Minister, 14 September 2002,
‘Iraq:
Pursuing the UN Route’.
205