The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
274.
Dr Albright
added that “according to Ambassador Ekéus”, UNSCOM had
“not
been able
to account for all the missiles Iraq acquired over the years”. He
believed it
was “highly
likely” that Iraq retained “an operational SCUD missile force,
probably with
chemical
and biological weapons to go with it”.
275.
Dr Albright
stated that, if Iraq was “released from sanctions and scrutiny”,
its
“current
government … would pick up where it left off” in 1991. “For those
reasons”,
US policy
would “not change”. The US did:
“… not
agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its
obligations
concerning
weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our view,
which
is
unshakeable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It
can only do that by
complying
with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is
subject.”
276.
Dr Albright
added that the evidence was “overwhelming” that Saddam
Hussein’s
intentions
would “never be peaceful”. The US looked forward “to the day when
Iraq
rejoins the
family of nations as a responsible and law abiding member”, and “a
change
in Iraq’s
government could lead to a change in US policy”. But until that day
came,
the US
would “insist, with all the diplomatic tools at our command, that
UN sanctions
remain in
place”, while doing what it “responsibly” could to “minimize the
suffering
of Iraqi
citizens”.
277.
Mr Ekéus
told the Inquiry that, after Dr Albright’s speech:
“Tariq Aziz
made it clear to me that from now on it would be close to
impossible
to convince
the President of the value of co-operating with the UN
inspectors.
This move
by the US was from our perspective destructive.”123
278.
The Security
Council was told in April 1997 that there had been tangible results
in
some areas
of UNSCOM’s activities but the capabilities which could not be
accounted
for could
not be ignored.124
279.
The report of
UNSCOM’s activities since 11 October 1996 stated that work
over the
last two
years had “led to the unmasking” of:
•
Iraq’s
biological weapons programme;
•
“highly
sophisticated and advanced work on the extremely lethal
chemical
warfare
nerve agent VX”; and
123
Statement
Ekéus, 23 April 2011, page 6.
124
UN Security
Council, 11 April 1997, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1997/301).
72