6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
even
CBW‑contaminated areas”, could be created “to channel Coalition
Forces into
urban areas
or ‘kill zones where artillery, or CBW, would be
used”.
1128.
Iraq’s
“strategy would rely heavily on a static defence, largely because
the Iraqi
military’s
ability to conduct manoeuvre warfare is very limited, even in the
R[epublican
G[uard]”.
If Iraqi defensive positions were:
“… left
behind the front lines by a rapid coalition advance, many RA units
would
probably
surrender rather than fight … [P]rovided that the security and
military
organisations
central to the regime’s survival … remained effective, Saddam
would
accept the
sacrifice of virtually any forces or territory … Provincial cities
would be
defended,
but ultimately … only Baghdad would be politically vital, as its
capture
would be a
final symbol of defeat of the regime. Although Iraqi forces would
look for
the
opportunity to counter‑attack, only a few RA units and the RG would
be capable
of doing so
… And we judge that Saddam would not be willing to risk the RG
units
held around
Baghdad except in a final defence …”
1129.
The JIC
identified that other Iraqi responses might include:
•
seizing
foreign hostages as “human shields”;
•
CBW
terrorism;
•
using
non‑lethal BW agents in a deniable manner;
•
suicide
attacks; and
•
a “scorched
earth” policy with the aim of creating a humanitarian
or
environmental
catastrophe.
1130.
The JIC
identified the policy implications as:
•
“If an
attack does not precipitate regime collapse and if Saddam’s key
forces
remain
loyal, they could inflict damage and casualties on coalition
forces, the
Iraqi
people or Iraq’s neighbours.”
•
“A
slow‑start Coalition would increase these risks.”
•
“Clear
messages to the Iraqi military might reduce their willingness to
obey
orders to
use CBW, but we cannot rely on this being the case.”
1131.
A handwritten
note from Sir David Manning to Mr Blair drew the Prime
Minister’s
attention
to the risks of a phased attack – the “ugly start”.443
443
Note
(handwritten) Manning to Prime Minister, 7 December 2002, ‘Iraq:
Military Options’.
345