The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
taken this
almost unmanageable problem forward in leaps and bounds,
but
there is
still some considerable way to go, and progress will not be
eloquent,
nor I sense
Western in its final form …”
151.
Lt Gen Lamb
concluded his note:
“Final
impression – more successful than we might imagine, more complex
than we
can
imagine, and an outcome likely to be more Iraqi than we have
imagined.”
152.
On 12
September, Mr Browne wrote to Mrs Beckett with a report of his
visit to
Iraq.105
He
considered that Op SALAMANCA “should create an opportunity for
other
government
departments to deliver on the medium‑term and capacity‑building
initiatives
… we must
make sure there is the closest possible linkage between
establishing
enduing
security with an Iraqi face and delivering benefit to the
Basrawis”.
153.
On the same
day, Mr Asquith wrote to Mr John Sawers, FCO Director
General
Political,
with his first impressions.106
Circulation
of his letter was deliberately limited
within the
FCO, but it was sent to Mr Martin Howard, MOD Director General
Operational
Policy, and
Sir Nigel Sheinwald.
154.
Mr Asquith
described the political challenges facing the Iraqi
Government:
“For a
government of national unity, most of its members are in
opposition. Rumours
of an
alternative government (of national salvation) or a military‑led
coup circulate …
“For the
Shia religious parties, CPA’s apportionment of representation on
sectarian
lines
encouraged them to lay hold to a preponderance of power which the
UIA
[United
Iraqi Alliance] are seeking to convert into a monopoly over key
decisions
on security
and the economy …”
155.
Mr Asquith
considered that part of the challenge was that:
“Maliki’s
true intentions [are] an enigma even to those in his government:
sectarian
going
through the motions of reconciliation, or genuine power sharer
constrained by
Shia
supremacists? It is still reasonable to give him the benefit of the
doubt that he
is the
latter …”
156.
The “heart of
the problem”, in Mr Asquith’s opinion, was:
“If facing
us down on the nuclear agenda is Iran’s top priority and ensuring
at least
a
non‑hostile government in Baghdad is sufficient for them, they will
advance their
nuclear
objective and achieve their sufficiency in Iraq by manipulating
their assets
here
against MNF and stoking the ambitions or sectarian prejudices of
those in the
UIA [United
Iraqi Alliance] …
105
Letter
Browne to Beckett, 12 September 2006, ‘Secretary of State for
Defence Iraq Visit’.
106
Letter
Asquith to Sawers, 12 September 2006, ‘Iraq: First
Impressions’.
32