9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
921.
On 19 June, a
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2)
wrote
to
colleagues:
“Reaction
in Whitehall has been predictably mixed. CJO is very supportive.
FCO
(McDonald)
supports but would like to have been informed at an earlier
stage.
Aldred
(Cabinet Office) hasn’t read the … letter of 13 June but would like
to call
a meeting
before any further detainees are released. No.10 (Sheinwald) have
no
objection,
but want a submission on where we have got to so we can get
ministerial
top cover …
We are going with the No.10 ruling.”503
922.
The senior
official explained that the submission would be drafted in London
but
commissioned
government officials working closely with the military in Iraq to
provide
contributions.
It would need to cover:
•
the “back
story”;
•
levels of
IDF before and after the three‑day cease‑fire, and
casualties;
•
details of
the next phase proposed (ie of the next two detainees JAM1
had
asked for,
and “what we would get in return”);
•
an idea of
“where we might go next”;
•
technical
details of how the Divisional Internment Review Committee
(DIRC)
process
worked (who sits on the committee, what their legal responsibility
is,
and whether
they consult with the US or Iraqis);
•
what the US
view was, because “if they don’t sign‑off in theatre we will need
to
rethink”;
and
•
how to
“handle the Iraqis” and what their views were.
923.
On 20 June, a
senior government official specialising in the Middle East
(2)
sent advice
to Mr McDonald and Mr David Richmond, FCO Director
General Defence
and
Intelligence, for onward submission to Mrs Beckett.504
The advice
was copied to
Mr Desmond
Bowen, MOD Policy Director.
924.
The senior
official sought authority to attempt cease‑fire negotiations with
key
elements of
JAM in Basra. This would be co‑ordinated closely with GOC MND(SE)
and
the British
Consul General in Basra. Urgent approval was requested in order to
maintain
momentum
and to prevent possible discredit to the JAM
interlocutor.
925.
The senior
official went on to describe the outcome of the trial
cease‑fire:
“Reporting
from Basra shows a sharp reduction in rocket and mortar fire
against
Basra
Palace and Basra Air Station (BAS) over 15‑17 June. There were
indirect fire
(IDF)
attacks on Basra Palace and BAS every day 11‑14 June, no attacks at
all on
503
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2), 19
June 2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
[JAM1]’.
504
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to
McDonald, Richmond & Foreign
Secretary,
20 June 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]: Shia Engagement’.
173