6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
79.
Mr Powell
replied: “I assume you are drawing up a lot of difficult questions
to put
80.
The MOD
alerted No.10 on 8 January to the proposed deployments to
the
South,
which would be crucial to the US plan.
81.
Addressing
the perceived advantages and disadvantages, the MOD
stated
that the
South offered a high profile role which was achievable within US
timelines
and offered
the UK a significant voice in US decisions.
82.
The
disadvantages included the impact on the US if the UK
subsequently
decided not
to participate in military operations.
83.
A letter from
Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir David Manning on 8 January
reported
the US
proposal and the potential roles in the South for UK
forces.20
84.
The MOD
advised that the US judged time was too short to deploy both a US
and
UK division
through Turkey and that: “Inevitably the US priority” was to “keep
alive
the
possibility of deploying their own division … to maintain the
strategic benefit of a
northern
axis”.
85.
After
describing the proposed roles for three brigades, the MOD
stated:
“On a first
reading, there are a number of attractions. This would be a
high-profile
role for UK
ground forces at the beginning of any campaign, in an area in
which
the threat
(barring WMD use) is likely to be limited. When combined with the
offer
of US
logistic support … this has the potential to allow a significant
reduction in the
overall
number of Reservists we might require. Our initial assessment
suggests
that we
could achieve deployment within current US timelines, and sustain
such
a force in
theatre potentially for some time, allowing political flexibility
over timing.
The
proposed UK role in the South should enable US forces to reach
further,
faster,
whilst providing a coherent transition to aftermath operations – an
area of
acknowledged
UK expertise – in territory captured early in the campaign. It
would
demonstrate
at the very beginning of ground operations that this is a
Coalition,
rather than
a US-only, campaign …
“On the
other hand, there may be some disadvantages. The proposed UK
role
would be
crucial to the US plan in the South. Whilst this would give us a
significant
voice in
decision-making, it would also increase the military impact on the
US on
any
eventual UK decision not to participate in an operation: clearly,
this would
place us in
a very awkward position if the US seemed likely to want to proceed
in
19
Manuscript
comment Powell on Minute Bowen to Manning, 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Chiefs of Staff
Meeting on
9 [sic] January’.
20
Letter
Williams to Manning, 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
399