12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
939.
The Chiefs of
Staff considered the events at their meeting on 21
September,
briefed by
Lieutenant General Andrew Ridgway, the Chief of Defence
Intelligence.887
The minutes
recorded that:
“The
incident in Basra was the inevitable product of the dual loyalties
of IPS
members:
whilst giving Iraqis status and pay, it also enabled them to
sustain their
tribal,
religious and – in the worst cases – militia associations; these
reflected Iraqi
and Middle
Eastern society, did not necessarily represent infiltration, but
would
endure and
thus would remain a key planning consideration for Security
Sector
Reform
(SSR).
“The
success of SSR depended on the proportion of the Iraqi Security
Force
(ISF)
personnel that enjoyed these dual loyalties benignly without
affecting their
professional
integrity, against the number that exploited their ISF positions to
effect
intimidation
and murder … this proportion was not known and was unlikely to
be
clear for
another six‑nine months …
“The
continued existence of insurgents in the ISF evinced the weakness
of the Iraqi
Ministry of
the Interior (MOI): having failed to purge and reform the IPS,
despite
being aware
of problems for at least a year, the MOI needed to be galvanised by
UK
Government
pressure through the Cabinet Office.”
940.
Mr Straw
chaired a meeting on 23 September – involving Dr Reid,
Mr Benn,
Gen Walker
and senior officials from No.10, the FCO and DFID – to discuss the
incident
and agree
what advice should be put to Mr Blair on current policy for
South East Iraq.888
A record of
the meeting by Dr Reid’s Private Secretary stated Sir Nigel
Sheinwald
“stressed
that the PM needed advice on how to deal with the political and
security
strands of
our policy; he was not expecting a sudden lurch in any direction
away from
our current
plan”.
“During
discussion it was stressed that the incident … should be seen as a
relatively
minor one
which had resulted in a great deal of media
attention.”
942.
Those present
at the meeting “agreed that the incident would probably prove
to
be a blip
but it had highlighted the need to review the overall strategy and
ensure we
were on the
right track”. Dr Reid “suggested that the IPS be audited by a
UK specialist”,
Mr Asquith
agreed to investigate the practicality of getting someone like
Sir Ronnie
Flanagan,
HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, to provide the
analysis.
887
Minutes, 21
September 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
888
Letter
Naworynsky to Asquith, 26 September 2005, ‘Meeting to Discuss South
East Iraq: Impact of
Security
Incident in Basra’.
271