The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“best‑case
assumptions” on the progress of the conflict, including limited
internecine
conflict.619
Officials
suggested that Mr Hoon remind Ministerial colleagues that
there was
“at least a
credible possibility that none of these conditions will
obtain”.
1408.
At the Azores
Summit, Mr Blair, President Bush and Mr Aznar discussed
the risk
of communal
violence and the need for it to be “handled rapidly by the
military”.620
1409.
From
September 2002, the FCO warned that war in Iraq might create
an
easier
environment for terrorists.
1410.
“Maintaining
firm control on the internal security situation” was among
the
“practical
steps” to provide stability proposed by the FCO.
1411.
In late
February 2003, the DIS Red Team warned of the risk of
Coalition
military
action creating fertile ground for Al Qaida, which could
deliberately cause
civilian
casualties to undermine the establishment of a representative
Iraqi-led
administration.
1412.
The first FCO
paper for the AHGI, written in September 2002, stated
that
war in Iraq
might create an easier environment for terrorists to operate in and
would
create a
new incentive for them to act. UK Embassies and other interests
might be
1413.
Three JIC
Assessments, on 10 October 2002, 10 February 2003 and 12
March
2003,
judged that the greatest terrorist threat in the event of military
action against Iraq
would come
from Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists.622
1414.
The 6 November
2002 edition of the SPG paper on UK military strategic
thinking
on Iraq
stated:
“Operations
in Iraq may have a negative impact on the UK’s policy objectives
for
international
terrorism, as poor handling of a post-conflict Iraq has the
potential to
increase
greatly anti-Western feeling in the region; fuelling the very
international
tensions we
have sought to diffuse and arming the forces of
extremism.”623
1415.
The FCO paper
on Islamism in Iraq, shared with the US in December
2002,
warned that
it was likely groups would be looking for “identities and
ideologies on which
619
Minute
Sec(O)4 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Aftermath – Medium to Long
Term UK
Military Commitment’.
620
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in the
Azores: 16 March’.
621
Letter
Sedwill to Manning, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Consequences of
Conflict for the Region and
Beyond’
attaching Paper Directorate for Strategy and Innovation, [undated],
‘Iraq – Consequences of
Conflict
for the Region and Beyond’.
622
JIC
Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat
from Iraq’; JIC
Assessment,
10 February
2003, ‘International Terrorism: War with Iraq’; JIC
Assessment, 12 March 2003, ‘International
Terrorism:
War with Iraq: Update’.
623
Paper
[SPG], 6 November 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
558