3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
representational
regime: Various ideas for replacements have been aired
over
the years
and none so far look convincing …”
12.
Mr Webb’s view
was that “the prospects for finding a stable political
solution”
were “poor
in the short term”. The US had “sufficient forces to undertake a
military
operation …
without anyone else’s help”; but to “achieve a successful regime
change,
the UK
would need to be actively involved (one might also argue that the
Prime Minister
has
effectively committed us)”.
13.
Mr Webb set
out the MOD’s thinking on military issues. On the way forward,
he
wrote:
“Despite
the massive scale of commitment, there are arguments that
preventing the
spread of
WMD should be given the highest priority in coming years … [I]t
remains
the
greatest risk to Middle East and international stability in the
medium-term; and in
the
long-term countries like Iraq and Iran are on course to threaten
Europe and UK
direct. It
is arguable that preventing this spread by making an example of
Saddam
Hussein
would do more for long-term stability than all the displaced
[military]
activities
combined …
“By
demonstrating our capacity for high intensity warfare at large
scale [the
deployment
of a division] the UK would also send a powerful deterrence
message
to other
potential WMD proliferators and adversaries.
“… There
would come a point at which preparations could apply some
valuable
pressure on
Saddam; or be seen as a natural reaction to prevarication
over
inspections.
In general … until that point … we should keep a low profile
…”
“Even these
preparatory steps would properly need a Cabinet Committee
decision,
based on a
minute from the Defence Secretary …”
15.
In April the
MOD established “a small group of senior officials and
military
planners to
think about the issues that would be involved in any military
operation in
Iraq, as
the basis for initial contingency planning in the
MOD”.5
That body,
which was
chaired by
Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott, Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff
(Commitments)
(DCDS(C) and was known as the Pigott Group, considered
issues
related to
UK participation in a US-led ground offensive in Iraq. Participants
included
the FCO,
the Cabinet Office and the intelligence Agencies.
16.
The work of
the Group is addressed in more detail in Sections 6.1 and
6.4.
5
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 25 April 2002, ‘Iraq:
Contingency Planning’.
5