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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
892.  A later report stated that Gazelle had subsequently been withdrawn from theatre
because it had “proved too vulnerable to ground attack”.471
893.  On 18 November, Mr David Williams, MOD Director of Capabilities, Resources
and Scrutiny, wrote to Mr John Dodds, Head of the Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence
Team in the Treasury, seeking advice on how to take forward new force protection
measures within the agreed UOR “ceiling”.472 Mr Williams flagged a new requirement
for £22m of UOR funding for area surveillance. Mr Williams’ request for the funding
of electronic countermeasures is addressed earlier in this Section with regards to
protected mobility.
894.  Mr Williams described the need for air surveillance assets as “effectively a ‘force
multiplier’ in that a greater effect could be achieved by cueing and focusing fewer ground
assets than by maintaining large bodies of troops in static guarding roles”. The existing
arrangement, whereby UK military personnel were guarding key sites within MND(SE),
had prevented troops from being employed in more “proactive, deterrent or offensive
security tasks” and raised more suspicion than would be the case with more remote
surveillance, such as helicopters and UAVs.
895.  Mr Williams wrote:
“The potential solution to the requirement is to seek area surveillance capabilities
since our forces lack UK‑dedicated, persistent (in terms of time/duration over the
areas/targets we wish to watch) near real‑time and long‑range capabilities, suited
to the differing requirements in urban and rural areas, that can produce pictures …”
896.  Mr Williams stated that, to date, the MOD had deployed a combination of assets
in its inventory but only as an interim solution and this had not been effective for urban
areas. In addition, the interim systems would suffer in spring when the weather became
hotter and some aircraft would be required to return to Northern Ireland.
897.  Mr Williams wrote that this was being addressed by:
a surveillance solution based on a UAV that would cost approximately £10m
for which three potential suppliers had been sent an Invitation To Tender;
potentially using Lynx helicopters with a surveillance pod for the urban
requirement; and
a manned surveillance platform for the “pan‑Iraq” requirement.
898.  Further work was being done to develop business cases for the latter two options.
471  Report DOC, 22 February 2005, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 2’.
472  Letter Williams to Dodds, 18 November 2003, ‘Additional Operation TELIC UORs’.
152
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