The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
280.
Sir Hilary
Synnott wrote in his memoir:
“With the
rising summer temperatures and the sudden influx of funds from
increased
salaries
and reconstruction contracts, the local people had been buying up
newly
available
electrical goods, especially air conditioners. The demand for
electrical
power and
fuel generators soared. Suddenly, the supply failed to keep
pace.
Generators
tripped and the diesel fuel distribution chain broke apart. Riots
erupted
outside our
Electricity Accounts building. Instead of just stones and rocks,
there was
now gunfire
… Within a day, however, the Army had stepped in to organise the
fuel
distribution
network … The violence subsided to a normal level as quickly as it
had
281.
Cabinet Office
officials reported on 14 August that “Daytime Improvised
Explosive
Devices
(IEDs), followed up with sniper or rocket propelled grenade
attacks, are
becoming
increasingly common”.151
282.
Officials from
the FCO reported “cautious progress” on the political
process.
Ambassador
Bremer and Mr Richmond were “encouraging the Governing Council
to
make
decisions”. A list of ministerial names was being drawn up but it
was not clear how
the
Constitutional Preparatory Committee would be chosen. Foreign
Ministers from the
Arab League
had announced that they would not recognise the Governing Council,
but
would work
with it.
283.
On 14 August,
the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1500 (2003).
There
were 14
votes in favour. Syria abstained.
284.
This short
resolution welcomed the formation of the GC as “an important
step
towards”
the creation of an internationally-recognised representative
government in Iraq.152
285.
Operative
paragraph 2 of the resolution created the United Nations
Assistance
Mission for
Iraq, to support the Secretary-General in fulfilling the
responsibilities he had
been given
in resolution 1483.
286.
The Cabinet
Office assessed that:
“The
passage of UNSCR 1500 and UK lobbying have contributed to a more
positive
regional
attitude to the
Governing Council.”153
287.
On 14 August,
Cabinet Office officials reported to members of the AHMGIR that
the
GC had
announced the formation of “a 25-member, all male committee of
technocrats to
prepare for
the Constitutional Convention”.154
150
Synnott
H. Bad Days in
Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern
Iraq. IB Tauris
& Co
Ltd.,
2008.
151
Briefing
Cabinet Office, 14 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers, 14
August 2003’.
152
UN Security
Council resolution 1500 (2003).
153
Briefing
Cabinet Office, 20 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers, 21
August 2003’.
154
Minute
Drummond to Owen, 14 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for
Ministers’.
254